CONTEMPORARY EURASIA IX ( 1 )
Rafik Hariri ’ s assassination . Later , the Special Tribunal for Lebanon ( STL ) was set up in May 2006 . Its mandate was to prosecute the perpetrators of the Hariri assassination . The 8 March forces declared that “ the investigation and the tribunal are instruments of the USA , France and Saudi Arabia as well as 14 March to pressure Syria and Hezbollah . 49 Defenders of the court argue that the investigation should be independent of any government .
Confessional solidarity was a major factor in rallying popular support behind Saad Hariri after his father ’ s assassination . 50 The success and the limits of this strategy arose from Hariri ’ s position in the Sunni community . Rafik Hariri had built some of his own institutions , especially the Hariri Foundation and a political organization called the “ Future Movement ”. However , more often than not , Hariri was not so much displacing existing Sunni structures but using patronage resources and a highly flexible “ ideology ” to entice existing Sunni social , religious and political organizations into joining his network . The “ Future Movement ” could be all things to all people , claiming to pursue a range of contradictory goals such as being a champion of neo-liberalism , a defender of the Sunni community , an ally of Saudi Arabia and the West , an opponent of Syria and Iran , and a patron of the “ poor ”. The backdrop to this strategy of confessional mobilization was the emerging Sunni-Shia contradictions in Lebanon . Within the confessional logic of Lebanese politics , the assassination of the most prominent Sunni leader was perceived as an attack on the whole community . 14 March immediately blamed Syria and its main Lebanese ally Hezbollah , achieving the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon . This , in turn , increased the insecurity of Hezbollah , which had relied on Syria to protect its status as a legitimate resistance movement . The domestic rift was doubled by confessional violence in Iraq and the development of a regional Sunni-Shia split , which also involved a deepening of Saudi-Iranian contradictions . The 2006 war between Israel and Lebanon exacerbated the confessional divide . While Hezbollah considered it a vindication of the need for “ resistance ” as deterrence , 14 March denounced the “ recklessness ” the militia had displayed in drawing Lebanon into war . Hezbollah ministers and their allies had participated in the government of Fuad Siniora after the May 2005 elections but in December 2006 , five Shia ministers and one Christian associated with 8 March withdrew from the cabinet . 8 March organized a protest in central Beirut , demanding that Siniora resign . Given Lebanon ’ s power-sharing formula , the protest was interpreted as a Hezbollah attack on Sunni prime ministership and hence on the Sunni community as a whole . The Sunni-Shia split thus led to a closing of ranks within the Sunni community and provided
49
Nadim Shehadi , Elizabeth Wilmshurst , The Special Tribunal for Lebanon : The UN on Trial ? ( London : Chatham House , 2007 ), 8 .
50
International Crisis Group , Lebanon Politics : The Sunni Community and Hariri ’ s Future Current , Brussels : ICG , 2011 . 18