LILIT HARUTYUNYAN
the state , markets and privatization provides scope for cronyism and rentseeking . 28 Hariri ’ s reconstruction program was neoliberal in both these senses . He sought to open up investment opportunities for foreign investors and the new contractor bourgeoisie , while also seeking to ensure that he and his business allies obtained the largest slice of the pie . The politics of reconstruction in central Beirut and the effects of “ anchoring ” the exchange rate through government borrowing at high interest rates have been described in great detail elsewhere . 29 The important point here is that Hariri applied a neoliberal logic determined by his class position . In order to realize the two policies , Hariri placed former employees and associates at the head of the institutions in charge of reconstruction and finance : the Council for Development and Reconstruction ( CDR ) and Solidere , the central bank and the finance ministry . 30 Hariri was not in complete control of economic policy . When he was out of office from 1998 to 2000 , President Emile Lahoud and Prime Minister Salim al-Hoss obstructed the Solidere project and changed the modus operandi of government debt management . Hariri ’ s efforts at privatizing state-controlled entities such as the electricity company , telecommunications and the national carrier Middle East Airlines were countered by former militia leaders and the military establishment , all allied to Syria . Hariri ’ s rivals feared a curtailment of their patronage power and sought to prevent Hariri from acquiring even more economic power .
The alliance with Saudi Arabia had been the basis for Hariri ’ s ascent to power . Saudi Arabia brokered the US-Syrian concord which facilitated the Taif Agreement of 1989 31 and enabled Syrian troops to dislodge its greatest opponent , General Michel Aoun , from the presidential palace in 1990 . In return for Saudi acceptance of Syrian dominance in Lebanon , the Assad regime tolerated Saudi-ally Hariri as prime minister . Hariri ’ s “ reconstruction ” was running alongside the “ resistance ” by Hezbollah . In the 1990s , Rafik Hariri defended Syrian dominance in Lebanon and supported the marginalization of any opposition to Syria . However , this was an alliance of convenience , and tensions between Hariri and Damascus came to the fore
28
See Steven Heydermann , Networks of Privilege in the Middle East : the Politics of Economic Reform Revisited , 292-322 .
29
George Corm , “ Reconstructing Lebanon ’ s Economy ”, in Shafik N . ed ., Economic Challenges Facing Middle Eastern Countries : Alternative Futures , ( Basingstoke : Macmillan , 1998 ), 116-135 , Deoneux Giulain , Robert Springborg , “ Hariri ’ s Lebanon : Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa of the Levant ?”, Middle East Policy , 6 , No 2 ( 1998 ), 158-173 , Gaspard Toufic , A Political Economy of Lebanon , 1948-2002 : The Limits of Laissez-Faire , ( Leiden : Brill , 2004 ).
30
Hannes Baumann , Citizen Hariri and Neoliberal Politics in Post-War Lebanon , ( PhD Thesis , London :, SOAS , 2012 ), 62 ; Giulain Deoneux , Robert Springborg , “ Hariri ’ s Lebanon : Singapore of the Middle East or Sanaa of the Levant ?”, Middle East Policy , 6 , no 2 ( 1998 ): 158-173 .
31
See Joseph A . Kechichian , “ One Lebanon was his vision ”, Gulf News Weekend Review , May 9 , 2008 .
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