verimatrix_verimatrix 30/09/2013 07:12 Page 2
COMPANY CONTRIBUTION
end protection of the content as
well as control over the number of
devices receiving the content,
while the local operator maintains
the role as the primary TV
provider to the subscribers.
Evolving STB content
protection requirements
Hardware security core in the STB chipset.
pirates and this makes the control
paths vulnerable to analysis and
potential alteration. Certainly, if
software runs in an unprotected
STB host environment, skilled
hackers can figure out how to
short-circuit the access entitlement logic and/or extract CWs.
By integrating the security
implementation with the support
of a hardware security core, the
potential for hackers to use emulators and rogue devices to manipulate the content access decision
and extract CWs is greatly
reduced. Hardware security cores
can therefore play a significant
role in enabling the use of cardless
CA for mainstream one-way
broadcast operation.
Example 2: Hybrid broadcast
– broadband support –
Flexible hardware security cores
will support the different scrambling and rights processing
schemes used for DVB broadcasting, IPTV live-TV streaming and
on-demand delivery. The same
core can then be used to harden
both the broadcast CA and the ondemand and streaming digital
rights management (DRM) system
clients of hybrid STBs and homegateways providing a very compact
solution supporting picture-in-picture, recording one programme
while viewing another and multiroom even if the content is
received from different networks.
Example 3: Two-way pay-TV
networks – When distributing
pay-TV content via two-way networks, the STBs authenticate
themselves to a head-end
CA/DRM server. The server
becomes the point of decision
making for individual STB and
content entitlements, and provides
the information necessary for
accessing the content after entitlement verification.
While two-way communication
offers more control options than
one-way distribution – including
positive acknowledgement of
updates and integrity checks – it
does not completely eliminate the
threat of CW sharing attacks and
potential client emulation. If
pirates are able to hack a
STB/device using a sophisticated
form of logic attack (for example
DPA), or otherwise appear as
authentic for the CA/DRM server,
they might obtain access to the
compressed digital content as well
as CW information that can be
used for CW sharing.
Device authentication performed in conjunction with headend servers, including HW sup-
from other technology environments can achieve a strong
composite ‘seat belt + airbag’
effect. If the card, security app or
hardware security core is penetrated, hackers would still need to
break the other protection(s) to
compromise overall security.
Note that such double configuration is different from Simulcrypt.
Normal Simulcrypt assumes the
receiver device to have a single
security module that processes a
single CA/DRM only, while parallel CA configuration assumes the
receiver device to have several
security modules configured in a
way that forces pirates to break
them all to exploit the system.
Example 5: Cloud based OTT
content distribution service –
A cloud-based content distributor’s security app can be installed
on operator client devices that
Hardware security cores in STB
chipsets represent the next step in
STB content protection.
Their first and foremost contribution is a significant increase of
robustness where it is now needed: inside the STB chipsets.
Leaving minimal room for piracy
benefits all stakeholders along the
value chain.
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