ELYA AGHAJANYAN
War in 2016 was a manifestation of Azerbaijan ’ s military power and was a “ vindication ” of its massive expenditures on defense over those thirteen years . 80 A question arises here . Can it be claimed that this war expressed the failure of his long-pursued policy towards Armenia ? Following the events in the aftermath of this war and Aliyev ’ s rhetoric , it may be claimed that until 2018 Aliyev was not sure how to regain his previous position in the peace process . For instance , in 2016 , Aliyev declared that there are pressures on Azerbaijan “ behind closed doors to recognize Nagorno-Karabakh ' s independence .” 81 What does this mean ? It is known that after the April War , a meeting between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place in Vienna , and one of the things that was discussed was the establishment of “ confidence-building mechanisms .” 82 However , Azerbaijan has always been opposed to this idea . Does this mean that the April War weakened Aliyev ’ s position , his conflict management strategies failed and that is why he was pressured to agree to concessions ? The third stage of his conflict management efforts below may answer this question .
The last stage began in 2018 as it was a year of changes in Armenia due to the widespread protests and Nikol Pashinyan ’ s rise to power . One may observe that during this period of internal instability in Armenia , Azerbaijan closely followed the developments without even trying to take advantage of the opportunity . One of the explanations may be that Baku was waiting for this regime change in Armenia and anticipated that the newly elected authorities would adopt a more compromising stance regarding the NK issue . Aliyev ’ s speech at the beginning of 2019 testifies to this argument where he mentions that the regime change in Armenia brought hope for a breakthrough in the negotiations , calling it a victory for Azerbaijan : “ I can also say that our thought-out , focused and principled policy against Armenia has yielded fruit . We have isolated Armenia from all regional and international projects , and our share in the collapse of the Armenian economy is quite large .” 83 Thus , it can be noted that the power change in Armenia reignited
80 Laurence Broers , “ How Ready Are Armenia and Azerbaijan for Peace ?” Chatham
House , January 24 , 2019 , https :// www . chathamhouse . org / expert / comment / how-ready-arearmenia-and-azerbaijan-peace . 81 Aliyev : Azerbaijan is forced to Recognize the Independence of NK , Aysor . am , October
3 , 2016 . https :// www . aysor . am / am / news / 2016 / 10 / 08 / Ալ ի և-Ղարաբաղ / 1149480 . 82 “ Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group ,” Vienna , OSCE Minsk Group , May 12 , 2016 , https :// www . osce . org / mg / 239696 . 83 “ President Ilham Aliyev : We remain committed to our principled position on the
settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ,” Azertag , January 1 , 2019 , https :// azertag . az / en / xeber / 1229495 . 72