HERMINE HOVHANNISYAN
majority , Saudi Arabia , with the support of the United States , helped Iraq throughout the war , which resulted in the weakening of Iran ’ s regional influence . 72 However , in 2003 , when the US toppled Iraqi Sunni-led Baathist Party leader Saddam Hussein , for the first time in history , a Shiite politician became the president of Iraq . Thus , the balance of power turned in favor of Iran . This , in turn , triggered another proxy war in Lebanon in the mid-2000s . As sectarianism was highly expressed in Lebanon , Saudi Arabia and Iran easily penetrated and even influenced the country ’ s domestic parties and militias . In order to project and expand its influence , Iran provided significant support to Hezbollah in Lebanon . 73 Thereby Saudi Arabia and Iran waged “ a new kind of proxy struggle , not on conventional military battlefields , but within the domestic politics of weakened institutional structures .” 74 Keeping in mind their aspirations for regional hegemony , these two rivals continued to entrench and deepen sectarian divides aimed at “ mobilizing supporters based on religious identity markers ”. 75
Saudi Arabia ’ s and Iran ’ s intervention in the Yemeni and Syrian civil wars is also based on sectarian ideas . Iran has supported the Houthis , a minority group within the Shi ’ a community , while Saudi Arabia has backed Yemen ’ s Sunni leadership . In the case of Syria , the Kingdom has funded Sunni rebels , while Iran has supported the Syrian government . 76 However , it should be noted that waging proxy wars , aiming at gaining influence in the region , was a real threat to the regional balance of power and another reason for unending regional hegemonic rivalry because they were becoming more inclined to proxy conflicts just to hinder the other side in order to increase its influence and relative gains .
Furthermore , Saudi Arabia ’ s major concern is the Iranian nuclear project ( INP ). Though Iran always assures that they are using nuclear technology only for the peaceful production of energy , the Kingdom regards it with suspicion . Iran started to develop nuclear programs in the 1950s , but its secret plans were revealed in the 2000s when it was found out that fuel enrichment was too high to be used for peaceful purposes . 77
72
Fisher , How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East . 73 Pauline Crepy , “ Proxy Warfare ’ s Impact on Sectarianization : The Case of the Saudi-
Iranian Rivalry , Flux : International Relations Review 9 , no . 1 ( 2018 ): 23-35 .
74
Fisher , How the Iranian-Saudi Proxy Struggle Tore Apart the Middle East . 75 Crepy , “ Proxy Warfare ’ s Impact on Sectarianization : The Case of the Saudi-Iranian
Rivalry ,” 33 .
76
Ibid .
77
Nina Mast , The Israel Lobby and US Policy in the Middle East : The Iraq War , The Egyptian Arab Spring , and Iran ’ s Nuclear Program , ( Carnegie Mellon University , 2014 ).
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