CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 94

TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY AND SECESSION AS STRATEGIES OF CONFLICT …
distributing propaganda leaflets, promoting the idea of unification with the
Armenian SSR. The authorities continued to threaten and silence the voices
bringing up the issues of discrimination against Armenians or proposing de-
annexation of Karabakh from Azerbaijani SSR. Many of these people were
deported in the 1930’s for allegations of “nationalism”. 22
Aside from political oppression, Armenians were discriminated
against in other spheres of public life. The economic and labour
opportunities of Karabakh Armenians were reduced, due to administrative
transformations. 23 Enterprises and industries were put under the jurisdiction
of regions outside the NKAO, which resulted in a shortage of jobs and
deindustrialization of the oblast. Industrial projects envisaged by five and
seven-year economic plans in the sectors of energy resources, provision of
electricity, and the food industry were not implemented. Some of the
economic activity realised in Karabakh was put under the jurisdiction of
bodies from Azerbaijan proper, in places like Aghdam, Barda, Kirovabad,
etc., 40-60km from Karabakh. 24 The oblast was constantly deprived of its
industrial infrastructure and was lacking in new projects. In agriculture, the
main industry of the region, progress was hindered by the authorities. Water
reservoirs were being designed to disproportionally benefit the Azerbaijani
populated villages. 25 As a result of these policies, the letter demanding the
reunification of Karabakh with the Armenian SSR or making it part of the
Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) concludes that “the
managerial-administrative functions of the region have all but disintegrated”
and resulted in the stagnation in the demographic growth of Karabakh
Armenians. 26 In the 1950’s, per capita capital investments in the NKAO
scored around ten times less than the average of the rest of the republic. In
the 1980’s, this gap decreased to 2-2.7% thanks to an increase in Azerbaijani
settlements. 27 However, there are also reports stating the opposite, i.e. that
NKAO scored higher in almost all economic activities. 28 We believe that
when it comes to the perceptions of local Armenians regarding their
22
Suren Zolyan, Нагорный Карабах: проблема и конфликт [Nagorno Karabagh: the
Problem and the Conflict], (Yerevan: Lingva, 2001), chap. 3,
http://armenianhouse.org/zolyan/nf-ru/karabakh/3.html.
23
Izvestia, March 15, 1988, tr. in CDSP vol. 40, no 13 8.
24
For example, the Sarsang reservoir was managed by Mirbashir. An experimental station in
Martunashen was managed from Baku. An automobile repair plant planned to be built in
Stepanakert was actually constructed in Kirovabad. The sojuzpetchat of Mars was moved to
Aghdam. The management of Mars silk industry was transferred to a much smaller enterprise
in Nuchi etc.
25
Libaridian ed., The Karabakh File, 43-46.
26
Ibid, 45.
27
Zolyan, Нагорный Карабах: проблема и конфликт [Nagorno Karabagh: the Problem and
the Conflict], chap. 3, http://armenianhouse.org/zolyan/nf-ru/karabakh/3.html.
28
Anatoly N. Yamskov, “Ethnic Conflict in the Transcausasus: The Case of Nagorno-
Karabakh” Theory and Society: Special Issue on Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union, Vol. 20,
No. 5, (1991): 658.
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