CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 60
CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: WHAT IS BISHKEK’S HEDGING STRATAGEM?
Chinese seaborne imports by obstructing the way through this volatile
chokepoint. 56
By expanding westwards, China’s engagement with Kyrgyzstan is
deemed essential for long-term leverage by constituting a social contract
based on “economic development for natural resources” patterns, in
recognition of Bishkek’s interests and preferences. Kyrgyzstan itself does
not expose substantial amounts of natural resources, compared to
Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. However, it does play a significant role within
the framework of Beijing’s “railway diplomacy” by providing natural
resources and unconditional loyalty in exchange. China has launched the
construction of railways and roads as a gateway to Central Asia, connecting
Kashgar (Xinjiang) with Andijon in Uzbekistan via the Kyrgyz cities Osh
and Irkesham, in order to avoid the dependency on the transport corridor via
Kazakhstan. Consequently, Beijing obtains the advantage of transferring its
goods on alternative routes, in case of a deterioration of relations with either
Kazakhstan or Russia. In view of the governmental reconsolidation after
2010, Kyrgyzstan has induced substantial investments, grants and the
extensions of credits from China. These aspects related to Kyrgyzstan’s role
as a transit country contribute to the connection with markets in Europe, the
Middle East and Southeast Asia, as Bishkek is able to overcome the
“transport deadlock” by becoming a land-linking country. Simultaneously,
Kyrgyzstan acknowledges that it has to abide by certain regulations set by
China, in order to ensure Beijing’s long-term leverage. This primarily
involves adherence to the one-China policy, unconditional support of China
concerning issues related to Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, as well as combat
against the “three evils” in the security domain. 57 In addition to allowing
Kyrgyzstan to increase electricity exports, China is also committed to
providing loans to construct hydropower stations and power transmission
lines. As Kyrgyz technology does not suffice to produce the amount that
Beijing needs to satiate its domestic market, Bishkek made considerable
concessions, as it has enabled China to expand its investments in
Kyrgyzstan, notwithstanding domestic resistance and concerns about a
potential Chinese takeover. 58
56
Cole, China's Quest for Great Power, 135-137; Philipp Andrews-Speed and Roland
Dannreuther, China, Oil and Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2011); Chen Shaofeng,
“Has China's Energy Quest Enhanced Its Energy Security?”, The China Quarterly, No. 207
(September 2011): 600-625.
57
Timur Dadaev, “’Silk Road’ as Foreign Policy Discourse: The Construction of Chinese,
Japanese and Korean Engagement Strategies in Central Asia”, Journal of Eurasian Studies,
Vol. 9, No. 1 (2018): 30-41, here 38; Stobdan, Central Asia. Democracy, Instability and
Strategic Game in Kyrgyzstan, 184-188.
58
Ibid., 188-192.
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