CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 60

CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: WHAT IS BISHKEK’S HEDGING STRATAGEM? Chinese seaborne imports by obstructing the way through this volatile chokepoint. 56 By expanding westwards, China’s engagement with Kyrgyzstan is deemed essential for long-term leverage by constituting a social contract based on “economic development for natural resources” patterns, in recognition of Bishkek’s interests and preferences. Kyrgyzstan itself does not expose substantial amounts of natural resources, compared to Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan. However, it does play a significant role within the framework of Beijing’s “railway diplomacy” by providing natural resources and unconditional loyalty in exchange. China has launched the construction of railways and roads as a gateway to Central Asia, connecting Kashgar (Xinjiang) with Andijon in Uzbekistan via the Kyrgyz cities Osh and Irkesham, in order to avoid the dependency on the transport corridor via Kazakhstan. Consequently, Beijing obtains the advantage of transferring its goods on alternative routes, in case of a deterioration of relations with either Kazakhstan or Russia. In view of the governmental reconsolidation after 2010, Kyrgyzstan has induced substantial investments, grants and the extensions of credits from China. These aspects related to Kyrgyzstan’s role as a transit country contribute to the connection with markets in Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia, as Bishkek is able to overcome the “transport deadlock” by becoming a land-linking country. Simultaneously, Kyrgyzstan acknowledges that it has to abide by certain regulations set by China, in order to ensure Beijing’s long-term leverage. This primarily involves adherence to the one-China policy, unconditional support of China concerning issues related to Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan, as well as combat against the “three evils” in the security domain. 57 In addition to allowing Kyrgyzstan to increase electricity exports, China is also committed to providing loans to construct hydropower stations and power transmission lines. As Kyrgyz technology does not suffice to produce the amount that Beijing needs to satiate its domestic market, Bishkek made considerable concessions, as it has enabled China to expand its investments in Kyrgyzstan, notwithstanding domestic resistance and concerns about a potential Chinese takeover. 58 56 Cole, China's Quest for Great Power, 135-137; Philipp Andrews-Speed and Roland Dannreuther, China, Oil and Global Politics (London: Routledge, 2011); Chen Shaofeng, “Has China's Energy Quest Enhanced Its Energy Security?”, The China Quarterly, No. 207 (September 2011): 600-625. 57 Timur Dadaev, “’Silk Road’ as Foreign Policy Discourse: The Construction of Chinese, Japanese and Korean Engagement Strategies in Central Asia”, Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2018): 30-41, here 38; Stobdan, Central Asia. Democracy, Instability and Strategic Game in Kyrgyzstan, 184-188. 58 Ibid., 188-192. 60