CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 51

MAXIMILIAN OHLE, RICHARD J. COOK, ZHAOYING HAN & RYSBEK MAMAZHANOV
Recalling the ancient Silk Road spirit, China is seemingly attempting to re-
establish a form of radial regional hierarchy – Central Asia being a focus –
through the use of economically orientated bargains, primarily based on
energy security. 22 This signals a fundamental shift from its decades-old
“keeping a low profile” stance, to a “regional power with global ambitions”
and furthered by the desire to “take initiatives to shape its environment in a
favourable direction”. 23 Considering these developments, David A. Lake
argues that China has been seeking to legitimise its power capabilities to
expand its influence along and beyond its borders, including Central Asia,
demonstrating its dedication to retaining a regional hegemonic position. 24
The age-old “Great Game”, originally referred to the Russo-British
geopolitical rivalry, has long dominated notions of great power competition
between various regional hegemons in the Eurasian heartlands, driven by the
geopolitical expansion of influence in this region. As stated by Alexander
Cooley, “Central Asia has been viewed as an arena of high-stakes
geopolitical sparring, while its location at the crossroads of multiple empires
has subjected it to a rich array of pressures, influences, and cultures”. 25 A
“Contemporary Great Game” nevertheless has different ramifications. As
Russia views itself as a legitimate successor to the dominant Eurasian
position, traditional IR thought would consider China, with its briskly
expanding relative capabilities and its encroaching BRI programs as a
significant opposition. 26 Here, typical patterns of power shift generally fall
around either (1) rivalry, often illustrated as a Thucydides Trap or (2)
peaceful change, both potentially inferring at a clash of hierarchies.
However, due to the Sino-Russian entente, there is the insinuation that (3)
economic zonal cooperation is also a major theme surrounding the
22
Alessandro Arduino, China’s Private Army. Protecting the Silk Road (Singapore: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2018), 69-72, 76.
23
Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement”, Chinese Journal
of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2 (April 2014): 153-184. As for Chinese assertiveness,
see Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?”, International Security, Vol. 27,
No. 4 (2003), 5-56; Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 90, Issue 2 (March/April 2011); Andrew Scobell and Scott W. Harold, “An
Assertive China? Insights from Interviews”, Asian Security, Vol. 9, No. 2 (2013): 111-131;
Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive is China’s New Assertiveness?”,
International Security, Vol. 37, No. 4 (2013), 7-48; Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Sources of
Chinese Conduct: Explaining Beijing’s Assertiveness”, The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37,
No. 4 (2015): 133-150; Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay“,
The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Winter 2015): 151-170; Björn Jerdén, “The
Assertive China Narrative: Why It is Wrong and How so Many Still Bought into It”, The
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2014): 47-88.
24
David A. Lake, “Domination, Authority, and the Forms of Chinese Power”, The Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Winter 2017): 357-382.
25
Alexander Cooley, Great Games, Local Rules. The New Great Power Contest in Central
Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3-4.
26
A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), 10; Robert Gilpin,
War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 186-210.
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