CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VIII (1) ContemporaryEurasia81 | Page 49

MAXIMILIAN OHLE, RICHARD J. COOK, ZHAOYING HAN & RYSBEK MAMAZHANOV
this instance, the subordinate views the political order as valuable and a
better alternative to the conditions of self-help. If interests, incentives and
preferences de-align or disequilibrium occurs between the dominant and the
subordinate, the political order may break down, as the subordinate moves to
help itself, defects to a differing political order, or by the dominant ejecting
the subordinate.
Inherently, authority, here principally rationalised as “rightful rule”,
requires the maintenance of political order via the dominant’s ability to
enforce rules, if necessary by coercion. 13 This pattern shadows Thomas
Hobbes' Leviathan i.e. the dominant, as recognised as the supreme authority
by the subordinates that have relinquished their “rights”, in order to escape
from the state of nature. 14 Robert Dahl attempts to operationalise this process
as “the ability of A to get B to do something he would otherwise not do”,
therefore implying that a dominant would be able to assert legitimate
leverage through a social contract. 15 Nevertheless, the subordinate would
retain the ability to conduct various actions, as the dominants’ authority is
never absolute, invalidating the notion that sovereignty is indivisible. 16 As
such, this intra-hierarchical arrangement operates through the transfer of
varying degrees of the subordinate’s authority to the dominant. The more
authority bestowed, the tighter the hierarchy i.e. the greater the influence of
the dominant possesses over the subordinate’s policies. Nonetheless, a
dominant must not overstep its authority, and in turn, allow the subordinate
to undertake certain duties under the framework of the political order to
reinforce its rational functionality and dilute the notion of an overpowering
hegemon. The aesthetics of the hierarchical bargain must mutually conform
to both the dominant and subordinates interests, incentives and preferences,
which in turn reinforce the performance, procedural and principles of the
political order. This delivers incentives for better net benefits and mutually
strengthens the hierarchical order, as the social contract remains active,
deterring anarchical relations. 17
13
Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, 8; David A. Lake, “Escape from the State of
Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics”, International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1
(Summer 2007): 47-79, here 50; David A. Lake, “Hobbesian Hierarchy: The Political
Economy of Political Organization”, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 12 (2009):
264.
14
Thomas Hobbes, Richard Tuck eds., Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a
Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996),
chapters 13 and 17.
15
Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power”, Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 1957):
201-215, here 202. A similar observation has been made by Richard E. Flathman, stating “If
A has the authority X, those persons who are under A's jurisdiction therefore have an
obligation or obligations Y”; Richard E. Flathman, The Practice of Political Authority:
Authority and the Authoritative (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), 35 and chapter 5.
16
Alexander Cooley and Hendrik Spruykt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in
International Relations (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009).
17
Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations, 8-16.
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