CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Seite 64

CONTEMPORARY EURASIA
radicalization of Islam in the northern Caucasus and within Russia as a
whole. 6
The Chechen struggle against the secular federal authorities provided
both historical and religious justifi cation for the Wahhabi of the region to
turn to violence. Historically, the North Caucasus has been less developed
region, and after the collapse of the SU the economic situation deteriorated
rapidly. From the religious point of view, many local Wahhabi took arms in
self-defense against the actions of Russian security services. The Russian
overwhelming military response during the fi rst Chechen war created many
grievances among the local population, which pushed individuals towards
radicalism. 7 While the second Chechen war created a new Islamic dynamic
in the region by institutionalizing offi cial Islam and marginalizing Islam-
ic insurgences. 8 After pro-Russian president Ahmad Kadirov, then his son
Ramzan Kadirov many radical Islamists were physically destroyed. The re-
maining insurgences were under the leadership of Hamil Sadulev (d. 2006)
and Doku Umarov (d. 2013) who created the “Caucasus Emirate.”
It is argued that Muslims of Russia are highly diverse and practice dif-
ferent forms of Islam, compared to the North Caucasus, in Volga – Ural
the number of Islam practicing Muslims is low. 9 Moreover, the Muslims
of North Caucasus and Volga – Ural regions are weakly connected. Tatar
communities have no say in the North Caucasus, and likewise. 10
Some authors argue that Tatar Muslims are russifi ed and have weak
Islamic traditions, 11 while others claim that, though Tatar Muslims are
culturally and spiritually close to Russia, there are no obstacles for them
to develop strong Islamic foundations. 12 Tatar Muslims belong to Hanafi
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12
Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko, “Vremya Yuga: Rossiya v Chechne, Chechnya v
Rossii,” (in Russian), [Time of South: Russia in Chechnya, Chechnya in Russia], (Carnegie
Moscow Center, 2002): 257; Elena Pokalova, “Islamic Radicalization in Russia’s North Cau-
casus: Lessons from Russia’s Handling of Religious Revival,” Journal of Balkan and Near
Eastern Studies, (2017).
Pokalova, Ibid.
Galina Yemelianova, “Islam, Nationalism and State in the Muslim Caucasus,” Caucasus Sur-
vey, vol. 1, no.2 (2014): 3-23.
Elise Giuliano, “Islamic Identity and Political Mobilization in Russia: Chechnya and Dages-
tan Compared,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics (2005): 195-220; Aleksey Malashenko,
“The Dynamics of Russian Islam,” February 1, 2013, Carnegie Moscow Centre, http://carne-
gie.ru/2013/02/01/dynamics-of-russian-islam-pub-50811(accessed March 12, 2018).
Ahmed Abdel-Hafez Fawaz, “The Muslims in Russia: Between Historical Legacy and Con-
temporary Problematics,” Contemporary Arab Aff airs, vol. 9, no. 3 (2016): 365-382. ilatov,
a, ianova, ess (2004).
Galina Yemelianova, “Islam and Nation Building in Tatarstan and Dagestan of the Russian
Federation,” Nationalities Papers, vol. 27, no. 4 (1999): 605-629; Aleksey Malashenko,
“The Dynamics of Russian Islam”.
Rafael Khakim, “Russia and Tatarstan, Anthropology & Archeology of Eurasia,” Anthropol-
ogy & Archeology of Eurasia, vol. 37, no. 1 (1998): 30-71; Sergei Filatov, “Tatarstan: At the
Crossroads of Islam and Orthodoxy,” Religion, State and Society, vol. 26, no. 3 (1998): 265-
277; Guzel Yusupova, “Making Ethnic Boundaries in the Society of Religious Renaissance:
Islam and Everyday Ethnicity in Post-Soviet Tatarstan,” National Identities, vol. 20, issue 4,
(2018): 345-360.
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