CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 6

CONTEMPORARY EURASIA
damage that will induce additional huge losses for recovery or turn out to
be impossible to heal altogether.
The vulnerability of the land bases is considered to be the most salient
as they are few and identifi ed and can be exposed to attacks not only by
traditional off ensive armaments but also by terrorist and other capabilities.
Especially problematic might be strikes launched by the Chinese Army to
target the US military installations located in South Korea, Japan, the Phil-
ippines and other parts of the region. Some experts assert that these attacks
are extremely dangerous also for the Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) when the
CSGs strikes may not be as eff ective, as long as only the 2 nd artillery corps
of the Chinese Army has formed seven brigades of short-range ballistic
missiles, three medium-range ballistic missile brigades and three brigades
of ground-based cruise missiles. 7 Based on various estimates, the number
of Chinese short-range missiles for close range operations runs up to 1000
and “CJ-10/20” “H-6K” bombers armed with cruise missiles can reach as
far as even American bases “Apra Harbor” and “Andersen”. 8 PLA is cur-
rently developing ballistic missiles with the range of 3000-5000 km “be-
yond the second chain of islands” (Japan, Guam and the Mariana Islands,
right up to Indonesia) bringing its capabilities closer to high-precision
strikes. 9 In 2013 according to “The US-China Economic and Security Re-
view”, PLA in multifaceted way is rapidly developing its striking capabili-
ties directed to American installations, Navy and Air Force bases located in
the Pacifi c, including in Guam. 10
The US potential adversaries’ reconnaissance and strike networking
systems include torpedoes, air, sea, and ground-based anti-ship cruise
missiles, as well as ballistic anti-ship missiles in relation to China and
Iran. Chinese “DF-21D” ballistic missiles (aircraft carrier “killer”) have
more than 1500 km range, which allows them to attack large warships,
including aircraft carriers in the Western Pacifi c. 11 As stated by a num-
7
8
9
10
11
6
Ron Christman, “China‘s Second Artillery Force” in China’s Near Seas Combat Capabili-
ties, Eds. Peter Dutton, Andrew Erickson and Ryan Martinson, China Maritime Studies, no.
11, (Newport: Naval War College Press, February 2014) 31–34.
Toshi Yoskihara, “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval Presence in Japan: The Oper-
ational View from Beijing,” Naval War College Review, Vol 63, no. 3, (2010), https://www.
usnwc.edu/getattachment/69198ee2-edc2–4b82–8f85–568f80466483/Chinese-Missile-Strat-
egy-and-the-U-S--Naval-Presen (accessed November 5 2018).
Andrew Erickson, “Beijing‘s Aerospace Revolution” in Chinese Aerospace Power, Eds. An-
drew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 7.
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2013 Report to Congress, Wash-
ington, DC: GPO, November 20, 2013, 233, http://www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2013-an-
nual-report-congress (accessed November 5, 2018).
Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, “Military and Security De-
velopments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013,” 5-6, http://archive.defense.gov/
pubs/2013_china_report_fi nal.pdf (accessed November 7, 2018); Ronald O‘Rourke, “China
Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities,” Congressional Research
Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Washington, DC: CRS, August 2018, 5–6, https://www.
fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf (accessed November 5, 2018).