CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 59

HRANUSH DERMOYAN
courts were also stated as progress. The 2011 report states the oversight
of the military expenditures as progress. The 2015 report states the fol-
lowing in regards to Turkey’s progress on civilian oversight over the mil-
itary “The situation in this area remained stable, without undue interfer-
ence in politics by the military. Civilian oversight of the law enforcement
duties of the gendarmerie was widened. The military and intelligence
services lack accountability in parliament”. 48 One of the main accents
of Erdogan was the weakening of the NSC under the EU reforms. The
number of civilian members was increased on behalf of military mem-
bers, the Secretary General of the Council was chosen from the ranks of
civilians rather than amongst generals and the decisions of the NSC were
given an advisory status and were not regarded as mandatory. The duties
of the NSC were also limited to defense and security policies, thus the
NSC could not exercise infl uence in every aspect of social life in Turkey
anymore.
The reforms had another result which indirectly contributed to the
weakening of the military’s political power. With the reforms the strict
ban on religious practices was lifted, adherents of Islam were not sup-
pressed anymore which weakened the public support of the military. Up
until the 90s whenever there was political instability in the country the
society expected the military to intervene and restore order. The fact that
thousands of people took to the streets in support of Erdogan proves that
the military did not enjoy the public support it ones used to. The failure of
the coup can be attributed to the weakening of the military under the EU
promoted reforms and the fragmentation in the Turkish military. On the
eve of the coup plot the civil-military balance had shifted in the country.
And as only a faction of the military participated in the coup plot, the ci-
vilians were able to take control of the situation as the core of the military
was under their control.
Conclusion
At fi rst sight the 2016 July coup attempt may not seem very diff erent
from previous coups. It followed the usual plot of coups; offi cial build-
ings were seized, generals were abducted, an announcement was made on
the main TV channel and adherence to Kemalism and secularism was em-
phasized. Despite the similarities there were also start diff erences. Only a
faction of the military participated in the plot limited to a group from the
48
EU Commission, Turkey 2015 Report, November 10, 2015, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbour-
hood-enlargement/sites/near/fi les/pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_turkey.pdf (ac-
cessed March 15, 2018).
59