CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 55

HRANUSH DERMOYAN
relations and the integration of the armed forces within the society as well
as the involvement of the security personnel in trainings on democratic
values and human rights. 39 As Turkey aspired for full membership into
the European Union the reforms of the civil-military relations had to be
carried out within these lines, which also entailed reforms of the judicial
system and governance.
Since 2001 Turkey has shown signifi cant progress on DCAF reforms,
which were conditioned by Turkey’s desire to join the EU. 40 In line with
DCAF requirements Turkey had to focus on a few major reforms, name-
ly to bring the Chief of General Staff under the oversight of the Defense
Minister instead of the Prime Minister, civilian bodies had to consist sole-
ly of civilian representatives which excluded the presence of military
representatives, the decisions of the Supreme Military Council were to
be open to judicial review, an institution of a military ombudsmen with
military oversight should be established. The Turkish legislation on civ-
il-military relations has been signifi cantly amended in harmonization with
EU norms. Among others, EU demands of democratic control included
full parliamentary oversight and control over military expenditure, re-
moval of military representatives from diff erent civil boards as well as
the restriction of military court jurisdictions over civilians. 41 From fi rst
sight it seemed that the defense budget was appointed and approved by
the parliament, however, in reality the parliament had no say in it and just
approved the budget presented to them by the military. 42 In 2003 Parlia-
ment authorized the Court of Auditors to audit the accounts of the TAF,
including state property. Although the military resisted and for example
classifi ed property and the Defense Industry Support Fund were not sub-
ject to audit, the fact that the parliament did authorize at least some audit
of military funds was an important step towards civilian supremacy. 43 An-
other major criticism of the EU underlined the presence of military mem-
bers and representatives in civil boards. For example, following the 1980
coup military representatives were appointed to such boards as the Higher
Education Council and the Radio and Television Supreme Council. This
was done in an attempt to control education and media broadcasts. With
reforms carried out between 2003 and 2004 the NSC and Turkish General
Staff were deprived of the authorization to appoint members to a num-
39
40
41
42
43
Bilgiç, “The military and Europeanization reforms in Turkey,” 803-824; Aylin Guney and
Petek Karatekelioğlu, “Turkey’s EU candidacy and civil-military relations: Challenges and
prospects,” Armed Forces & Society 31, no. 3 (2005): 439-462.
Arzu Güler and Cemal Alpgiray Bölücek, “Motives for reforms on civil–military relations in
Turkey,” Turkish Studies 17, no. 2 (2016): 252.
Bilgiç, “The military and Europeanization,” 803-824.
Bilgiç, Ibid., 805
Ibid.
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