CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 48

CONTEMPORARY EURASIA
fi cers started to compare themselves with their NATO counterparts and
became aware of their material backwardness. At the same time the busi-
ness sector was blooming and the junior offi cers felt even more neglect-
ed. Although the Democrats gave the impression that the military was far
from neglected, nonetheless it was obvious that the military institution
did not top the list of priorities for the government. When inter-party con-
fl ict erupted the discontent of the armed forces took a political direction.
The offi cers started to articulate their grievances which were similar to
those the of the opposition parties. The fi rst coup was carried out on May
27, 1960. When the coup took place there was almost no resistance from
troops loyal to the government and the coup was carried out with min-
imum bloodshed. The aftermath of the coup saw the adoption of a new
constitution, the creation of the National Security Council (henceforth,
NSC) and the victory of the Justice Party (henceforth JP) and its leader
Suleiman Demirel. With the new constitution and the establishment of the
NSC the military created for itself more levers to infl uence politics and
in the Justice Party (JP) it sought an ally which would run the country
according to the military’s notion of national interest. After the coup the
army became an autonomous institution and was recognized as the guard-
ian of the new regime it had put to power. 22 The new legislation improved
the economic standing of the soldiers. Thus the main concern of the mil-
itary became to sustain the regime rather than to back any political party.
Moreover, the military was ready to intervene against any political party
if the regime was threatened. The commanders had become a privileged
group in the society and did not need to link their interests with that of a
certain political party. On the contrary, it was the political parties which
needed to link their interests with those of the military.
The next military intervention happened in March, 1971. This inter-
vention was an interesting case as at fi rst it was not clear which faction of
the military had control. The military blamed the politicians for the inter-
vention, claiming that the reason behind the intervention was the policies
of the government that created social and economic unrest in the country.
Demirel resigned without much protest after he received a memorandum
from the military. As it turned out later, the intervention took place to
prevent a conspiracy which could have resembled the coup of 1960. The
intervention of March 12, was a preventive coup d’état which aimed to
prevent the actions of radicals, both military and civilian, who wanted to
overthrow the government and implement reforms which were demand-
ed by the intellectuals and the society alike. Reforms were opposed by
22
Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish experiment in democracy 1950-1975, (The Royal Institute of In-
ternational Aff airs, 1977), 197.
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