CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 18

CONTEMPORARY EURASIA
the direction of the missiles’ fl ights and they actually did not do anything
to head off the air strikes. If the Russian side did not take steps toward
that end, it was only because of technical diffi culties for implementation.
China’s Air Forces and long range AD can hit at best about 2000-3000
targets at a time, not including army’s AD and AD systems deployed in
depth, actions against which are less likely. Combat operations will take
place at best on the coast or coastal areas of China. It is naive to think
that there might be an action to occupy China. As we noted, in the fi rst
phase air strikes can be carried out through daily 5000-6000 sorties, in-
cluding with decoy missiles. Of course, the targets of initial destruction
can be just as many, but the gradual destruction or suppression is a matter
of time. The next strikes may doubly come down but this time the Chi-
nese air defense and air superiority capabilities would be signifi cantly
weakened. And it was then that the tactical air forces could put into action
more than 20,000 “AGM-154 JSOW” air-to-surface missiles, which are
mostly launched beyond the long-range AD assets operational zone, from
distances of 110-556 km. 31 Moreover, even American single-engine fi ght-
ers can carry these missiles. That is, once air superiority is established,
American planes can operate more easily and confi dently, striking targets
of second-hand importance. Additional density at this stage can be pro-
vided by various UAVs which can operate more eff ectively in conditions
of fairly suppressed air defenses. The US Air Forces and Navy are ready
for such density of air strikes and are able to conduct operations spanning
from one to six months, whereas the Chinese side simply cannot with-
stand this. The Russian Air Forces and Navy will suff er almost the same
fate in the Pacifi c theater, although there are some diff erences. The Rus-
sian Navy has counter-strike capabilities in a certain depth of an ocean
but the Russian side has other problems associated with actual supply of
modern anti-ship missiles, communications and control systems, etc.
In April 2017 media reported about a new Russian missile “3M22 Zir-
con (Циркон)” under testing that can break the velocity of Mach 8. Many
experts immediately considered this fact as very dangerous for American
ships, especially for carrier vessels. In reality though, detection and en-
gagement of ships at such speeds is quite diffi cult. 32 Undoubtedly, this is a
new issue, a new challenge for carrier vessels. However, there are several
systemic problems that seriously hinder successful employment of even
such missiles. First of all, it is about air superiority: the point is that air
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32
“JSOW-ER,” Guide to Military Equipment and Civil Aviation, http://www.deagel.com/Land-
Attack-Cruise-Missiles/JSOW-ER_a001153007.aspx (accessed November 7, 2018).
Dave Majumdar, “Russia’s Monster Battle cruisers Are Getting Hypersonic Anti-Ship Mis-
siles,” The National Interest, February 19, 2016, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/rus-
sias-monster-battlecruisers-are-getting-hypersonic-anti-15263 (accessed November 7, 2018).
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