CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VII (1, 2) Contemporary-Eurasia-3new | Page 127

LILIT GALSTYAN
role in the diplomatic and political confl ict settlement process within
the framework of the CIS. Hence, Russia also highlighted its important
contribution to the NK settlement process with other Minsk Group Co-
Chairs. As such, in May 2013, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov
stated that they have a primary task of unblocking the complex situation
in NK as the preservation of peace and stability constitutes a priority
within their foreign policy objectives. 57 In his turn, Vladimir Putin re-
ferred to NK confl ict, during his state visit to Armenia on December 2,
2013. Putin stressed the unique relationship between Armenia and Rus-
sia by indicating that it goes beyond strategic partnership. Further, the
Russian president mentioned, “Instead of resolving the regional compli-
cations by the use of force, we would all like to fi nd solutions to the re-
gional disturbances by using the diplomatically agreed upon international
arrangements. The Russian Federation welcomes the direct contacts be-
tween the two presidents. We will do our best to resolve the NK confl ict
and to fi nd solutions that would be acceptable for both parties.” 58
Nonetheless, for the situation on the border, the notions of “routine
violence” and “ongoing hostilities” best characterized the NK confl ict
particularly during the second administration of Vladimir Putin when the
violent military attacks started to escalate by melting the frozen confl ict.
Hence, Vladimir Putin was trying to continue the diplomatic process be-
tween the opposing sides for preventing the resumption of hostilities on
the border.
Along these lines, the Minsk Group organized a meeting between the
Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents on 19 November 2013, in Vienna.
Furthermore, president Putin had bilateral meetings with the Armenian and
Azerbaijani presidents when in 2014, the escalations of hostilities induced
the Russian president to persuade the sides to fi nd mutually acceptable con-
ditions for the confl ict resolution. 59 Still, Putin’s eff orts were fruitless as in
April 2016 the violations escalated when the Azerbaijani side presented its
carefully organized off ensive and surprised Armenians. The primary attacks
targeted villages within NK with rockets and artillery. The Armenian side
was not hesitant in responding the Azerbaijani off ensive and as a result, the
Line of Contact went through four days of war. 60
57
58
59
60
Romashov& Rytövuori-Apunen, “Russia’s Karabakh policy: new momentum in regional
perspective,” 7.
Vladimir Putin, “RD naxagah Vladimir Putini petakan aycy Hayastan,” (in Armenian) [“The
state visit of the president of the RF, Vladimir Putin, to Armenia,”] Hayastani Hanrapetutyun
No.220, 3 December 2013, 2.
Sabine Freizer, “Twenty years after the Nagorny Karabakh ceasefi re: an opportunity to move
towards more inclusive confl ict resolution,” Caucasus Survey vol. 1, issue No. 2 (2014): 5.
Artsrun Hovhannisyan, “Analysis of the 4-day April war,” Armenpress, April 2016, https://
armenpress.am/eng/news/843561/analysis-of-the-4-day-april-war.html (accessed February 8,
2017).
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