CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VOLUME VI (1) Contemporary-Eurasia-VI-1-engl | Página 48

ARAM ABAJYAN
economic security issues, and the participants meet every two years at
ministerial level 22 .
In June 2014 during the sixth meeting of CASCF in Beijing, there
were signed three major documents, including ‘Beijing Declaration’,
‘Action Plan for 2014 to 2016’, ‘Development Plan for 2014-2024’.
China proposed a comprehensive strategy on cooperation which became
known as 1+2+3. Three basic cooperation fields were including:
 Energy cooperation;
 Improvement of trade and investment;
 Cooperation in new sectors: nuclear energy, aerospace
technology, new energy 23 .
Beijing asserted that it will initiate steps for increasing bilateral
trade volume in coming ten years period from $240 billion in 2013 to
approximately $6000 billion. Meanwhile, it promised to expand
nonfinancial investment in Arab countries in coming decade from $10
billion in 2013 to $600 billion 24 .
At the opening ceremony of conference China’s President Xi
Jinping highlighted the significance of Chinese ‘One Belt, One Road’
initiative, which includes the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime
Silk Road of the 21 st century focusing mainly on trade and
infrastructure development projects. China’s leader also emphasized
the importance of development of Chinese and Arab societies close
integration processes, thus forming ‘community of common interests
and destinies’. Furthermore, in the Middle East China established a
strategic partnership with Egypt (1999), Saudi Arabia (1999), Algeria
(2004), Turkey (2010), United Arab Emirates (2012) 25 .
In July, 2004 finance ministers of all six GCC states visited Beijing
and the sides confirmed a ‘Framework Agreement on Economic,
Trade, Investment and Technological Cooperation’. In addition, they
agreed to negotiate on China-GCC free trade zone plan, which was
Chengxi Y., China lays out ‘1+2+3’ strategy at CASCF ministerial meeting,
CCTV
News,
06
June,
2014,
http://english.cntv.cn/2014/06/06/VIDE1402009324468536.shtml
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid
25
Cheng J., China’s Relations, op. cit., p. 52.
22
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