CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2) ContEurVIII2

ARAM ABAJYAN Middle East in 2000 reached nearly 54 percent. However, China’s success in expanding its oil imports from the Middle East was facing problems as well. US dominance in the region especially after 9/11, as well as the region’s frequent political instability was annoying Beijing. Consequently, China tried to put its eggs in more than one basket by setting its eyes on other oil-exporters. Beijing started to deepen its oil cooperation with other regions, while diversifying its import sources. It succeeded in its strategy to expand its oil relationship with Africa, particularly promoting ties with Angola, Sudan, Gabon, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Even though China succeeded in increasing its oil imports from the Middle East and Africa regions, concerns about oil transportation became another disappointing factor. In fact, over 75 percent of Beijing’s oil imports from the Middle East and Africa go through the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca, and as China lacks a blue-water navy, any hostile action by an external power or a terrorist attack could unavoidably shatter its oil routes. Thus, it continued to seek new large oil sources, expanding its energy ties with Russia. Since the 2000s, China’s oil diplomacy turned crucially towards Russia and Central Asia, attempting to foster closer energy cooperation with them. Latin and North American oil seemed attractive to China as well, and it has stepped up its oil commerce with them in recent years. Beijing gave special significance to Venezuela, which was not only South America’s largest oil producer, but also the fifth-largest oil exporter in the world. 36 China’s oil diplomacy, along with its quest for imported crude oil, is affecting its relations with other nations, and the main points here are the following:  Beijing is making every possible effort to strengthen and deepen its energy ties with both oil-producing and exporting nations;  China can cooperate and compete with the countries having moderate dependence on imported crude oil such as the United States, India, and the Southeast Asian states;  China can impulsively compete with the states heavily relying on imported oil, such as Japan. 37 China’s oil diplomacy can be viewed as peaceful and it does not undermine other players’ oil security. It is important to take into account two major factors: 36 37 Ibid, 527. Ibid, 529. 79

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