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CONTEMPORARY EURASIA VIII (2) been officially closed by Turkey as a result of the ongoing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh at the time. 39 Referring to Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, Mustafayeva (2018) asserts that even though the active phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ended in 1994, ceasefire violations are common along the line of contact. The unresolved conflict further escalated in April 2016 (known as “Four-day War”), when both sides suffered hundreds of losses. Due to its complicated relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Armenia regards Georgia’s developing cooperation with these two hostile countries as a serious concern. 40 Minasyan asserts that in its NSC, Georgia defines relations with Azerbaijan as a “strategic partnership” and Turkey as a “leading partner in the region” that is of strategic importance for Georgia both from a socio-economic and military standpoint, while Armenia is not defined in any of those ways. 41 For Armenia, the most burdensome aspect of Georgia-Turkey- Azerbaijan trilateral cooperation is the intention of Turkey and Azerbaijan to isolate it from all regional projects (i.e. Baku-Tbilisi- Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum gas pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad). 42 Chumbadze asserts that the enhancement of this trilateral cooperation will increase Georgia’s economic dependence on Turkey and Azerbaijan by expanding Azerbaijani-Turkish influence through investments and funds in various regional projects. 43 Ter- Matevosyan argues that besides economic expansion, Turkey seeks to expand its religious, educational, cultural, as well as humanitarian influence in Georgia by establishing corresponding institutions. 44 Problems of the Armenian Community in Georgia Another sensitive topic in the bilateral relations of the two countries is the situation of the Armenians living in Georgia. There has                                                              39 Sergey Markedonov, “Russia and the conflicts in the South Caucasus: main approaches, problems, and prospects,” Journal of Conflict Transformation 3, no. 2 (2018): 39. 40 Najiba Mustafayeva, “The Danger of No Peace, No War in Nagorno-Karabakh,” Turkish Policy Quarterly 16, no. 4 (2018): 121,. 41 Minasyan, “New Challenges”, 9. 42 Zaur Shiriyev, Institutionalizing a Trilateral Strategic Partnership: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (2016), 4, https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=cd257d1b-df92-5184-9ad4- 2a5dd95c0886&groupId=252038. 43 Chumbadze, “Foreign Policy Dimensions”, 71-85. 44 Vahram Ter-Matevosyan, (2017). “Turkish Soft Power Politics in Georgia: Making Sense of Political and Cultural Implications” in Religion and Soft Power in the South Caucasus, Routlege (2017): 35-55, file:///C:/Users/ADStudent/Downloads/Memo.pdf). 29