Compliance VIEWpoints-Issue 3-2024 November 2024 | Page 16

DOEREN MAYHEW throughout the last decade , it also did not implement any new products and services into it . For example , they started utilizing products , such as Zelle and Venmo , during the aforementioned time period , but never incorporated these products into their transaction monitoring process , which as it turns out , included transactions indicative of human trafficking . In addition , TD Bank did not automatically monitor all Automated Clearing House ( ACH ) transactions , among other transaction types .
Neglecting BSA / AML or any other compliance-related deficiencies can be far-reaching and create a gateway for financial criminals . In the case of TD Bank , it did just that . The bank ’ s BSA / AML monitoring and reporting failures made it conducive and handy for criminals .
Below is a listing of highlighted violations from FinCEN ’ s official consent order to TD Bank :
• Failure to Implement and Maintain an AML Program This violation goes deep . TD Bank had systemic BSA / AML failures , including awareness by senior management . Ultimately , the bank did not invest enough time , funds or managerial resources into the ongoing maintenance of its AML program . Control gaps were deemed to be too costly , which allowed illegal activity to stream through the bank . Some control gaps mentioned in the consent order included :
• Ineffective oversight by the BSA officer .
• Failure to timely and properly escalate material issues to the board of directors to provide adequate resources to assure the BSA compliance .
• Not ensuring appropriate transaction monitoring .
• Inadequate training for staff on AML and risks associated with the products and services offered .
• Deficient risk-based customer due diligence .
• Insufficient independent testing to identify material gaps in a timely manner .
The failure to ensure appropriate transaction monitoring mentioned here can simply be credited to the lack of ongoing monitoring of adequate controls and remediation of deficient controls . TD Bank failed to make meaningful changes to its transaction monitoring process over the last decade , as well as add any new scenarios and / or modify existing scenarios to properly identify and report suspicious activity . For example , the implementation of products , like Zelle and Venmo , were never considered to be monitored for suspicious activity .
• Meeting CTR Filing Requirements TD Bank ’ s violations of CTR reporting requirements included late filings caused by known technological issues and deliberately filing more than 1,000 inaccurate CTRs , some of which were misleading to law enforcement .
FinCEN identified over 4,000 late-filed CTRs throughout the specific period . In short , TD Bank blamed this deficiency on longstanding challenges with a vendor utilized to support its CTR filing process . The bank also failed to collect any form of identification ( i . e ., taxpayer identification number ) and report the individual conducting the transaction for several filed CTRs . Aware of the issue since 2019 , TD Bank considered it to be low priority and never resolved the issue . As a result , over 1,000 CTRs were filed with incomplete or erroneous information , which impeded law enforcement investigations for illegal behavior .
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VIEWPOINTS : REGULATORY COMPLIANCE EDITION | 07