SPECIAL REPORT
At the multilateral level, in 2013, a number of COMESA
member States were among the World Trade Organization
(WTO) members that concluded the negotiation of the
Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) at the Bali Ministerial
Conference. The TFA aims to address the vast amount
of “red tape” that exists in moving goods across borders,
which poses challenges for traders from both developing
and developed countries and imposes a particular burden on
small and medium-sized enterprises. It contains provisions
for expediting the movement, release, and clearance of
goods, including goods in transit. It also sets out measures for
effective cooperation between customs and other appropriate
authorities on trade facilitation and customs compliance
issues. By the time the TFA was entering into force in
February 2017, 12 out of the 19 COMESA Member Stated
(or 63%) had ratifi ed it, agreeing to implement the TFA upon
its entry into force. Moreover, a preliminary assessment
by COMESA to determine the level of alignment between
the TFA and the COMESA Treaty found that out of the 40
Provisions/Measures of the TFA, 28 (or 70%) were already
specifi cally catered for in the COMESA Treaty as of the time
of entry into force of the TFA. Again, the level of COMESA’s
dedication to using regionalism as the main avenue for
enhancing free trade is well-demonstrated.
However, Africa and indeed COMESA are not yet out
of the woods with regard to its pursuit of robust free-trade
regional frameworks, regulations, institutions, systems and
programmes; a lot of issues remain unresolved. These include
a battery of internal and external threats, which the continent
and the RECs, COMESA included, should keep striving to
manage and address.
Internally, the challenges
that arise from COMESA, EAC
and SADC and the countries
therein being considerably
heterogeneous were inherited
by the TFTA and now stand a
good chance of being carried
forward into the CFTA. For
instance, the issue of hugely
disparate Rules of Origin
between COMESA and EAC
on the one hand and SADC on
the other are likely to simply
escalate as countries from
ECOWAS, CEMEC, Maghreb
Arab League, etc. – with their
different trade protocols and
Origin Rules – now come on
board. Concluding negotiations
that balance and iron out the
20 • COMESA • 2018
divergent rules on the continent is something the RECs will
have to contend with.
Similarly, other than EAC and SACU – a Customs Union
made up of a subset of countries originally belonging to
either SADC or COMESA or both – the vast majority of
countries in the TFTA failed to establish a common external
trade position while they had been in their respective RECs.
Chances of establishing common trade and investment
(including debt accumulation) positions just became a whole
lot more complicated with the escalation to a CTFA. And
such a collective position would be critical to avoid threats of
large funding opportunities disrupting the continental agenda
on trade, investment, industrialisation, and human progress.
Another internal challenge in COMESA and in Africa at
large is the wide proliferation of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
COMESA and the TFTA have made strides in addressing
NTBs through, for instance, the NTBs Online Tracking and
Resolution Mechanism. Nonetheless, the natural inclination of
countries to protect their trade interest continues to add pressure
for the escalation of NTBs as tariff barriers have declined.
On the geopolitical and philosophical fronts, some
observers argue that regionalism has lost its lustre in Africa.
High profi le political champions with a core interest and
passion for keeping Africa’s enchantment with regional
integration and free trade alive are few and very far in
between. The deep passions of yesteryear people like the
late Nkwame Nhuruma of Ghana, the late Julius Nyerere
of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, who put their
lives and countries on the line for the idea of Africanism,
have signifi cantly diminished with time. Political leaders
have sometimes been accused of simply paying lip service