Climate Change: Considerations for Geographic Combatant Commands PKSOI Paper | Page 35

One example of the cross-cutting factors relates to
the competing Caribbean-nation partner Venezuela
which is in decline due to their economy’s almost singular reliance on reduced export income from petroleum.81 Their “PetroCaribe” arrangement of providing
bargain oil supplies to ten members of the Caribbean
Community along with the Dominican Republic and
Cuba is faltering. This energy instability leads to an
opening for these nations to seek alternative sources
of oil or alternative sources of energy altogether—in
line with U.S promotion of non-carbon [non-climate
change-causing] fuel sources as a part of the overall
Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI).82 The
CESI seeks to provide a market for energy, especially
U.S. liquid natural gas, as an alternative to the Venezuelan’s “Petrocaribe” construct which continues
to be propped up by Chinese financing.83 Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico have already “made
the switch” from Venezuelan diesel and fuel oil for
their electricity generation requirements.84 These intertwined economic-security-energy issues certainly
merit continued monitoring as a part of SOUTHCOM’s overall theater estimate and consideration of
significant “at-risk” oil infrastructure tied to sea level
rise projections.
A second example is Cuba. The recent U.S. rapproachment with Cuba creates the opportunity to use
the shared interest of climate change resiliency as a
vehicle for cooperative efforts. The methods the U.S.
uses for infrastructure hardening or other climate
change adaptation measures within the Caribbean
could in time be shared with the Cuban government
just as with other [potential] partner nations. As the
largest by population of the Caribbean nations, any
forward steps toward climate change resiliency tak-

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