to ensure sustainable freedom of movement for the population?
(Security)…Where and when can we enhance the growth of government capacity to serve the population? (Governance)” http://
smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/host-nation-information-requirements.
16. Dennis Barlow, The Kuwait Task Force: Postconflict Planning
and Interagency Coordination, September 2012 http://cco.dodlive.mil/
files/2012/09/cco_case_study_no._4-kuwait_task_force-student.pdf.
17. John R. Brinkerhoff, “Waging the War and Winning the
Peace,” a report prepared for the Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, by the Andrulis Research Corporation, October 9, 1991,
p. 51.
18. TRADOC Publication 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating
Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020-2040, 7 October 2014,
p. 6.
19. Ibid, p. 8.
20. Ibid, p. 14.
21. Ibid, p. 21.
22. Defense Science Board Task Force on Deployment of
Members of the National Guard and Reserve in the Global War
on Terrorism, 4 September 2007.
23. In 2005, the Army began to transform to a modular, brigade-centric force. The transformation of USAR CA units from the
A-series Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE)
to the G-series MTOE was scheduled to begin in 2008 and end in
2011. In the fall of 2005, however, the Joint Staff validated and
approved a Central Command request to deploy CA units in the
modular configuration to support corps, divisions, and brigade
combat teams. This decision required roughly two CA battalions
of the A-series configuration to deploy one CA battalion of the Gseries configuration. The grade and MOS shortfalls that remained
after this consolidation required reassignment and retraining of
hundreds of USAR Soldiers each year to meet deployment readiness goals.
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