Horn of Africa, as well as small mobilizations in support of DoS and DoD missions within assigned GCCs,
there is a distinct possibility of the AC CA units (both
conventional and SOF) assuming these missions for
the foreseeable future. This has the potential of eroding the operational experience earned at great cost,
with lessons relearned only when these RC units are
mobilized for a future contingency.
The post-9/11 era has demonstrated the ability
of the Guard and Reserve to generate forces for deployment, but only with significant mobilization, lead
time and resources.4 After the first rotation, the typical
unit often relied on cross-leveling Soldiers from other
units, and even from other services, in order to man
subsequent battle rosters. This was particularly true of
CA units, where experienced NCOs and officers were
in short supply, particularly those able to deploy. With
the total cost of deploying a soldier for a year ranging
from one to two million dollars, the answer to these
concerns is not to fight to preserve every slot in CA
units, but rather to increase the percent of qualified
CA Soldiers ready and available to deploy.
A streamlined yet more professional force would
trade numbers for expanded training and enhanced
efforts to identify, recruit, and retain higher quality
Soldiers. A ready and available Reserve CA soldier
would have the following characteristics:
• Physically fit- passing the APFT according to
SOF standards
• Experienced- either a prior deployment or having a secondary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)
• MOS-qualified- graduated from appropriate
qualification or Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES) courses
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