China Policy Journal Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2019 | Page 38

Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks’ Policy Influence
imprecision. As China’s foreign policymaking
is far less open and regularized
and its relevant power, resources, and
information are much more centralized
than the economic and social policymaking,
more caution is required for
the analysis of think tanks’ role within
this complex “black box.”
CIIS and SIIS are two of the most
elite foreign policy think tanks in China.
This case study on their influences
in the BRI policymaking has revealed
some structural characteristics of the
positions and roles of think tanks in
China’s foreign policymaking structure.
This paper establishes a synchronized
theoretic paradigm that interprets think
tanks as a “central space” in “three-layered
field of power” and builds an analytical
framework of “policymaking
pendulum between horizontal and vertical
fragmentation,” so as to elaborate
the roles and influences of CIIS and
SIIS on BRI policy issues. Based on this
guiding theoretic paradigm and analytical
framework, this paper focuses on
the meetings held by CIIS and SIIS for
BRI policy discussions. To be specific,
this paper calculates the participatory
rates of different social and political
groups of the four “sub-fields” (politics,
business, academia, and media) of China’s
“field of power,” and then analyzes
the exact structural characteristics of
CIIS and SIIS’s connections with these
“sub-fields,” particularly with policymakers
in the political circle.
The analysis of this paper reveals
that both CIIS and SIIS are closely connected
to central ministerial systems
through BRI meetings. Especially, the
links of SIIS as a provincial-level think
tank to central policymakers are still
more intimate than its relations with
Shanghai Municipal Government. Also,
the connections of CIIS through meetings
with central ministries outside the
MOF, such as foreign economic policy-related
MOC, MOT, and NDRC,
are substantially weaker than its links
with MOF. On the other hand, CIIS as
a central ministry-affiliated think tank
is very distant from provincial policymakers
due to the limitations brought
by China’s vertical executive compartmentalization.
These facts reveal the
typical features of “stove-piping” driven
by the structure and momentum of
“vertical fragmentation.” On the other
hand, SIIS has to maintain intimate relations
with central policymakers and
top leadership, and at the same time
keep substantial ties with Shanghai
government, demonstrating the mechanism
of “dual leadership” shaped by
“horizontal fragmentation” structure.
In general, the behaviors and influence
of CIIS as a central ministry’s subsidiary
are only subject to “vertical fragmentation,”
whereas SIIS as a think
tank financially dependent on a provincial-level
government has to maneuver
between “vertical” and “horizontal
fragmentation.” It is also revealed that
there are discrepancies in CIIS and SI-
IS’s connections with and influence on
academia, business, and media over
BRI policy issues.
In brief, faced with an increasingly
unpredictable external world
plagued by surging tides of populism
and de-globalization, China has to
manage new challenges that may dis-
29