China Policy Journal Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2019 | Page 36

Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks’ Policy Influence
policymakers, or requests of certain
social interest groups are heard by key
officials. Shanghai officials’ absence on
these platforms implies that they are
largely outside the inner circle that has
real power of BRI policymaking. In
other words, crucial resources, information,
and personal links related to
BRI policy issues are concentrated in
central-level government institutions,
so SIIS is compelled to operate more intimate
ties with central authority.
Actually, this centralized pattern
may be further strengthened in future
because of the situational changes highlighted
by two signs: (1) since CCP’s
18 th Congress in 2012, domestic and
foreign analysts have already observed
more traces of recentralization in economy
and government’s executive administration,
along the lines of “vertical
fragmentation”; (2) on March 17, 2018,
the decision to expand and upgrade the
“Central Small Leading Group for Foreign
Affairs” into “Central Foreign Affairs
Commission” took into effect as the
“Plan for Deepening the Reform on the
Institutions of the Party and the State”
was passed by China’s National People’s
Congress. Four previous “central small
leading groups” will be upgraded and
expanded into special “central commissions”
that will usually be controlled by
CCP’s central politburo and jointly operated
by top leaders of the party and
state. Also, several new central ministries
will be established, which will absorb
and gather competences of some
existing ministries, a situation similar
to the time of reform for “big ministry
system” in 2007. This latest round
of adjustment on central-level party
and state institutions may amass and
concentrate more resources and power
upward into the central party apparatus
and a few central ministries, therefore
intensifying “vertical fragmentation” to
some degree.
Third, CIIS indeed enjoys more
advantages than SIIS. The highly distinctive
percentage of each type of
meeting to the total numbers of meetings
disclose the differentiated positions
of CIIS and SIIS in BRI policymaking.
The percentages of the meetings of type
IV (symposium on specific issues) and
type VI (bilateral meeting) to the total
numbers of BRI-related meetings organized
by CIIS and SIIS are not vastly
different, showing the significance
of these two types as key channels and
platforms for CIIS and SIIS to push
forward their influences on BRI policy.
However, there is a vast difference between
CIIS and SIIS in the percentages
of meetings of type I (high-level forum),
type III (regular dialogue), and type V
(lecture meeting) to the total numbers
of meetings. The weights of these three
types to the total number of meetings
held by CIIS are much larger than those
of SIIS. As a matter of fact, the meetings
of type I (high-level forum) consume
tremendous quantity of resources, including
funds and expertise. And it is
not probable to organize the meetings
of type III (regular dialogue) and type
V (lecture meeting) without intensive
long-term and stable personal links to
the top-level policymakers and political
power. Therefore, much larger weights
of these three types in CIIS meetings
certify its large advantages compared
to SIIS in terms of resources and priv-
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