China Policy Journal Volume 1, Number 2, Fall 2019 | Page 20

Chinese Foreign Policy Think Tanks’ Policy Influence
Communist Party (CCP), the “Central
Foreign Affairs Commission” 6 and the
“Central Political Bureau” of CCP, which
is the concentrated core for final decision
making. The central level consists
of several structures in parallel for managing
specific areas. On this level, the executive
structure deals with the bulk of
foreign policy-related issues, with MOF
operating normal foreign policy and
Ministry of Commerce (MOC) responsible
for foreign economic issues. Provincial
governments have their own institutions
that play a function similar to
those of MOF and MOC, which are usually
named “Provincial Foreign Affairs
Office” and “Provincial Commission of
Commerce.” Those institutions under
the provincial level are largely irrelevant
to China’s foreign policymaking.
To a large degree, Chinese foreign
policy think tanks get tightly embedded
in this highly centralized and
hierarchic system. The CIIS is a “central-level”
think tank directly affiliated
to the MOF and acts as an analyzing
hub that disseminates processed information
and new policy ideas to MOF
leaders, whereas the SIIS is a “provincial-level”
think tank affiliated to the
Shanghai Municipal Government and
under nominal leadership of its foreign
affairs office. Their capacities of
academic research and policy advice
are deeply shaped by the entrenched
“reversed pyramid” pattern of information
and resource distribution. To
be specific, the lower the level that a
foreign policy think tank is located on
and the more junior executive status it
is granted, the less academic resources
and policymaking information it is
able to obtain from this system, and the
less capacity it may develop to conduct
cutting-edge researches on international
studies and offer high-quality policy
advice that may meet policymakers’ demands.
At the same time, unlike some
nonofficial think tanks specialized in
economic and social policy research,
Chinese foreign policy think tanks usually
find it very difficult to get substantial
nonofficial support from the underdeveloped
and immature civil society,
because foreign policy issues belong
to the “high politics” that is rarely concerned
by nongovernmental actors. In
other words, the CIIS as a central-level
think tank occupies a more advantageous
position than the SIIS as a provincial-level
think tank.
3.3. “Policymaking Pendulum
between Horizontal and Vertical
Fragmentations”: Analytical
Framework explaining the
Dynamic driving CIIS and SIIS’s
Interactions with Policymakers
6 Before March 2018, the “Central Small Leading Group for Foreign Affairs” had been operating as the
top-level institution of decision making in the field of China’s foreign policy, which had been controlled
by the standing committee of CCP’s central politburo and jointly operated by top leaders of
the party and the state. The third plenary meeting of CCP’s 19th central committee issued the “Plan
for Deepening the Reform on the Institutions of the Party and the State” during February 26–28,
2018, which stipulates that the “Central Small Leading Group for Foreign Affairs” shall be reorganized
and expanded into the “Central Foreign Affairs Commission,” which will still be largely controlled
by CCP’s central politburo. This plan was passed by the 1st plenary meeting of 13th National
People’s Congress (NPC) of China on March 17, 2018, and put into implementation since then.
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