China Policy Journal Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2018 | Page 21

China Policy Journal
effective enforcement of the system, it
is essential to identify the strengths and
weaknesses of the process. Though the
water-pollutant discharge-fee system in
China underwent reform and adjustment,
several thorny issues appeared
within the application process, such
as differences in the total fee amount,
which consequently led to the derivation
of the policy goal. Each element
is implemented based on the legal, administrative,
socioeconomic, and political
circumstances. As a linking procedure,
the policy’s implementation relies
on executors to realize the policy target
through explaining, propagating, testing,
conducting, and supervising. Integrated
management of water resources
is required to enhance the system.
4.1. External Factors
4.1.1. Social Factors
The water-pollutant discharge-fee system
is implemented to correct the market
failure and guide water use and
allocation. The main objective of the
water-pollutant discharge-fee system is
to protect water resources’ capacity and
productivity. Society provides the platform
for the system’s implementation.
System-policy enforcement refers to
the two main parties: the policy executor
who represents the government’s
behavior (Yang and Wang 2013) and
the water-pollutant dischargers, which
include individuals, units, and plants.
Most of the system’s procedures are
highly reliant on governmental officers.
The water-pollutant fee-collection
work is not only limited by understaffing,
but also by the noncompliance
operations and related individual behaviors
of local officials. Therefore,
different extent of pollutant-fee arrears
such as pollutant-fee negotiation and
relationship-fee collection, less payment
are quite common. The national
average fee-collection rate is only
50% and government interference is
also detected in the policy-enforcement
process. Local protection greatly
contributes to increasing the pollution
intensity (Jiang, Lin, and Lin 2014).
Administrative interference under regional
protection can be expected to
generate more space and uncertainty
in the policy’s implementation, which
is likely to lead to rent-seeking behavior
within the system’s operation. Reversely,
pollution behavior also affects
the system’s efficiency and proper implementation.
False consciousness of
pollution and the idea of emission as
“more payment, more discharge” are
formed within the discharger group
by the confused relationship between
the system-enforcement authorities
and dischargers’ noncompliance operations.
Certain phenomena such as
false or concealed reports in pollutant-amount
applications are sure to
impact the collection of the full pollution-discharge
fee amount. Simultaneously,
the pursuit of economic growth,
which was local governments’ most
important target and assessment index,
significantly impeded the system’s implementation.
Whether firms and plants actively
pay for their pollution discharge
is determined by their net profit. The
implementation of the fee system may
alter enterprises’ production activities
(Wu 2015) and increases production
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