China Policy Journal Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2018 | Page 155

China Policy Journal
established a municipal environmental
performance disclosure system called
the ENCB. Initiated in 2014, the ENCB
specifically targets polluting firms which
commit continued violations, and it focuses
more on the small polluters which
are difficult to detect and monitor by the
formal regulatory system.
The interagency environmental
supervision, conducted by the EPBs in
conjunction with the BODIs, was initiated
in 2006 as an instrument of political
implementation aimed at adding
political and economic costs on chronic
noncompliance. The Rules for the Listed
Supervision of the Cases of Environmental
Infringements enacted by the
MEP in 2009 specifically stated that the
polluting firms listed on supervision by
the environmental protection agencies
and departments of discipline include
polluters “failed to stop offences despite
repeated investigations and penalties.”
The involvement of the BODIs in environmental
law enforcement is a method
for not only enhancing the enforcement
of environmental standards and
rules, but it also enables the authorities
to punish the owners of the polluting
firms who serve in public office or who
are members of the local People’s Congress
or Political Consultative Conference,
specifically addressing the barrier
for effective environmental regulation
created by political connections and
protectionism. The implementation of
interagency environmental supervisions
has been associated with public
reporting, severe and continued infringements
disclosed by the PEPA,
and pollution control priorities set by
local EPBs. Supervised polluting firms
would usually be given six months to
reverse their noncompliant behaviors
by, for instance, reducing emissions to
the levels required by the pollution control
laws or investing sufficient money
in improving their abatement facilities.
If the supervised polluters failed to reduce
illegal emissions within the given
time limit and initiate new offenses,
they could be forced to shut down or
relocate.
These additional policy instruments
have led to the growing number
and severity of penalties against environmental
violations in Guangzhou.
For instance, the interagency environmental
supervisions have resulted in
a greater number of permanent shutdowns
and relocations of polluting
plants in Guangzhou (Figure 3). However,
most of the harsh penalties were
imposed on small factories without significant
economic and social impacts.
Large polluters, such as the SOEs and
big foreign companies, targeted by the
supplementary enforcement mechanisms,
have rarely been forced to shut
down or relocate even when their infringements
have been more serious
than those of the small polluters.
4.3. Criminal Prosecutions Against
Decision Makers in Polluting Firms
Effective legal measures are largely absent
in China to criminalize individuals
who are found to be responsible for
serious harm both to personal interests
and to public resources. Prior to 1997,
China’s pollution victims could initiate
legal actions against polluters only for
personal economic compensation and
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