BuildLaw Issue 39 April 2020 | Page 31

CCLA. As with ss 9 and 10 of the CRA, quantum meruit is not provided for. Even if there were substantive changes to that legislation in the future, it is unlikely that the current position on quantum meruit would change.
Comment
Mann confirms that quantum meruit claims, although not to be written off entirely, are now clearly limited in scope.
The decision has been much awaited as it has clarified the ongoing controversy as to what remedial options are open to a contractor upon termination of a building contract following repudiation by the principal. However, questions remain, particularly with uncertainty in relation to restitutionary claims as to whether simple pro-rating of the contract price or market value subject to the contract price cap is the appropriate methodology to calculate the amount recoverable and as to how an adjustable contract price may limit any quantum meruit assessment or how provisional payments might be dealt with in the same context.
This case has understandably drawn the attention of many in the legal field; it overturns in Australia an approach which has been upheld throughout much of the common law world for over 100 years. It will be interesting to see how other jurisdictions respond to Mann v Paterson. It is likely that, noting the dissatisfaction with the approach thus far, Mann v Paterson will spark change in other jurisdictions throughout the common law world.4

1 Watson v Watson [1953] NZLR 266; and Snell v Potter [1953] NZLR 696.
2 The remedies for cancellation were described in ss 9 and 10 of the CRA (now s 43 of the CCLA), and do not include the remedy of quantum meruit.
3 This was affirmed in Programmed Maintenance Services (NZ) Ltd v Witters HC Auckland CIV 2008-416-90, 8 April 2009.
4 See Kull, "Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract" (1994) 67 Southern California Law Review 1465; Havelock, "A Taxonomic Approach to Quantum Meruit" (2016) 132 Law Quarterly Review 470; Mark P. Gergen, Restitution as a Bridge Over Troubled Contractual Waters, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 709 (2002).
about the authors
Sophie Hursthouse
Sophie is a law clerk at Building Disputes Tribunal. She is studying at the University of Otago.
Laura Bawden-Hindle
Laura is a law clerk at Building Disputes Tribunal. She is studying at Victoria University of Wellington