BuildLaw Issue 26 December 2016 | Page 30

during a period of project overrun. Therefore, it appears that this exception would only apply in situations where the delay is a non-compensable Employer Risk Event.21 This was the recommendation that the SCL gave in the 2002 Edition.22
However, the example in the 2016 Draft is a variation and, giving the Employer a ‘blank check’ to instruct variations during a period of Contractor Delay or, in any event, after the original contract completion date, amounts to a windfall that does not respond to any consideration of fairness or reasonableness. Furthermore, it has been asked 23 how Balfour Beatty v Chestermount could survive if Colman J had started from the premise that no EoT would be granted in situations of an Employer Delay occurring during a period of Contractor Delay because that was precisely the situation he was considering in deciding that an EoT would be calculated on a ‘net’ basis.
In addition, the ‘but for’ justification at the heart of the 2016 Draft’s recommendation24 only takes account of one side of the equation. It says, “[…] the Employer Delay will not result in the works being completed later than would otherwise have been the case because the works were already going to be delayed by a greater period because of the Contractor Delay to Completion.” 25 In other words, ‘but for’ the Employer Delay, would the Contractor still be delayed? For the 2016 Draft, the answer is yes. Therefore, there is no concurrency. However, if applied consistently to any situation of concurrent delay, including ‘true concurrency’, this reasoning would result in the end of concurrency as we know it because it is always the case in concurrency that without the Employer Delay, the works would already be delayed by the Contractor Delay to Completion. This is because both delays are considered critical hence why they are concurrent.
The problem with this reasoning is that the opposite is also true: ‘but for’ the Contractor Delay, the project would still be delayed for the period of delay caused by the Employer. If each of the Employer and Contractor Delays are by this logic effective causes of delay on their own so that each lies on the critical path, concurrency is undeniable. When both delay periods sit on the critical path, a project is delayed in the absence of either delay due to the existence of the other. For example, ‘but for’ lack of access to site, the works are still delayed due to slow mobilisation. The opposite is also true.
Therefore, if the Employer Delay would extend the date of completion despite the Contractor Delay, even if it is by a shorter time, then the Employer cannot simply obtain a windfall for causing critical delay and effectively helping prevent the project from completing on time.
Finally, the recommendation does not hold its ground against the prevention principle. It would be against the principle to give the Employer a windfall in circumstances where he has effectively contributed in preventing the Contractor from completing the project on time. When holding that apportionment does not reflect English law, Akenhead J stated in Walter Lilly v Mackay26 that:
“Part of the logic […] is that many of the Relevant Events [i.e., Employer Risk Events] would otherwise amount to acts of prevention and that it would be wrong in principle to construe [the EoT clause] on the basis that the Contractor should be denied a full extension of time in those circumstances.”
He then stated that nothing suggested that an EoT should be reduced in case of concurrent delay.
Although he was referring to City Inn27 type apportionment, what the SCL is effectively suggesting is to ignore the prevention principle altogether and “apportion” all of the risk to the Contractor just because the Employer’s delay is shorter even though it could very well be an effective cause of delay.
Whereas it is the SCL’s prerogative to recommend what it considers preferable, this author hopes that the discussion about the way in which the recommendation is drafted and justified continues. The practical implications of a recommendation that swims so forcefully