PEPFAR effectively has “two heads” in Haiti using extra
staff time to little effect. The report found USAID’s country
strategy sharply focused and clear but limited in impact,
consisting largely of a sprinkling of uncoordinated projects.
Such examples showed the need for better planning
even before the earthquake. Now, Haiti’s challenges require
unprecedented levels of coordination and flexibility, both
among donors and within the U.S. effort. USAID should
continue to lead the U.S. response—but it will need expanded
authority, a more clearly-defined role, and sufficient financial
resources.
Haiti has suffered the largest urban disaster in modern
times. U.S. agencies need more flexibility to respond since
earmarks and regulatory requirements often prevent rapid
response to changing needs. Aid reform efforts—which
include broadening the base of partner organizations within
countries and allocating resources to local institutions—are
already underway at USAID.
More flexibility in procurement and contracting could
expand access to business opportunities for Haitians
and people in the Haitian diaspora—placing more of the
reconstruction in Haitian hands and harnessing the skills
and resources of those living abroad.
In the long run, a strong partnership with the Haitian
people will require a stronger USAID, with more technical
expertise and in-country staff, particularly in agriculture.
Development professionals empowered to be innovative,
resourceful, and focused on results should execute the U.S.
strategy for Haiti.
not emerge overnight. We will need to think in years, not
months, to measure the effectiveness of post-earthquake aid.
But our work in Haiti should ultimately result in concrete,
measurable, and sustainable improvements for its people.
Endnotes
1 As of July 2010, the USG, including USAID, Department of Defense and
State Department, has contributed nearly $1.2 billion in earthquake response
funding for Haiti. USAID/OFDA, Haiti Earthquake, Fact Sheet #61, FY21010,
July 2, 2010.
2 RNDDH
Report, May 12; Jesuit Refugee Services (website)
3
ICG Report: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-americacaribbean/haiti/032-haiti-stabilisation-and-reconstruction-after-the-quake.
aspx
4 Haiti Reconstruction Fund website:
http://www.haitireconstructionfund.org/hrf/governance
5
Isenman, Paul and Shakow, Alexander, “Donor Schizophrenia an d Aid
Effectiveness: The Role of Global Funds”, Institute of Development Studies,
Practice Paper, Volume 2010 Number 5.
6 “Empty Promises: Gender Scorecard of World Bank-Managed Post-Tsunami
Reconstruction in Indonesia”, Gender Action. Available from:
http://www.genderaction.org/images/GAGenderAnalysisMDF-Tsunami.pdf
7
Refugees International, March 2010 Report: http://refugeesinternational.
org/policy/field-report/haiti-ground
8
Jesuit Refugee Services: http://www.jrsusa.org/news/news_100302.php/
9
Refugees International, March 2010 Report: http://refugeesinternational.
org/policy/field-report/haiti-ground
10 “Why foreign aid to Haiti failed”, National Academy of Public
Administration. Available from: http://www.napawash.org/haiti_final.pdf
11
See “Haiti Reconstruction Platform” website: http://www.refondation.ht/
index.jsp?&lng=en
12
Conclusion: Where Does Haiti Fit in a U.S.
Development Strategy?
As efforts continue to rebuild Haiti, U.S. foreign
assistance is undergoing one of the most extensive reviews
in decades. The results should point to a new model for
foreign assistance—part of a larger strategy to reframe U.S.
aid efforts and priorities—whose central themes include
country ownership, interagency coordination, evaluation,
and accountability for results.
If we are serious about long-term engagement in Haiti,
the findings of the review should inform planning and
programs on the ground. The whole point is to harness the
considerable energy that still exists to make U.S. aid more
effective in building a better Haiti. A focus on meaningful
civil society participation, robust transparency, institutional
capacity-building, and long-term development will bring
greater returns on our investment.
Haiti is perhaps the toughest case, but also a worthy place
to test the U.S. political will to move toward meaningful
partnerships. A truly country-led development process will
www.bread.org
“Using Food Aid to Support, Not Harm, Haitian Agriculture”, CEPR:
http://www.cepr.net/index.php/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/using-food-aidto-support-not-harm-haitian-agriculture/
13 “Haiti Relief Effort Needs Immediate Ramp-up to Avoid Disaster”. Available
from: http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/relief-and-reconstruction-watch/
14
Peace Dividend Trust, “Haiti First Policy” proposal: http://www.
peacedividendtrust.org/en/?sv=&category=What%20We%20Do~PDM%20
Haiti&title=Haiti%20First
15
Global Hunger and Food Security Initiative Consultation Document,
September 28, 2009. Available from: http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/130164.pdf
16
World Food Programme: http://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti
17
The HDI provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human
development: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy),
being educated (measured by adult literacy and gross enrollment in
education) and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing
power parity, PPP, income). For the full report see: http://hdrstats.undp.org/
en/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_HTI.html. See also Transparency
International’s 2009 Corruption Perception Index: http://www.transparency.
org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table
18
World Food Programme: http://www.wfp.org/countries/haiti
19
http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2010/sp100505_1.html
20
Save the Children, Modernizing Foreign Assistance—Insights from the
Field: Haiti, October 2009.
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