USAID has been fortunate that NGOs and, to a large
extent so far, private contractors, have been staffed with
people dedicated to development who have been able to
partially compensate for the lack of technical competence
within USAID. Given the large pool of expertise outside the
agency, one might explore options for moving such people
into and out of government service on an expedited basis.
But without the long-term, in-house technical capacity to
plan and oversee grants and contracts, including rigorous
evaluation and application of lessons learned, it is only a
matter of time before the work quality of outside contractors
declines radically.
Conclusion
Programs concentrating on improving nutrition, health,
and education in poor communities all make people more
productive. So they will be looking for work. It will be
critical to have plans and resources in place to create jobs.
Without the jobs created by broad-based, agriculture-driven
rural growth, there is a danger that t he social programs will
create large numbers of healthy, educated, but unemployed
young people—a major source of instability—and will not be
sustainable without continued donor funding.
The needed changes in operating procedure are to focus
on aggregate national improvement in agricultural growth
rates, poverty reduction, women’s participation, and food
security. Such a turn away from individual small projects
requires changes in the measures of project success. The
other basic change is to recognize that well-performing
public institutions to complement private sector efforts are
essential. Most, if not all, aid projects should aim at leaving
behind a well-operating national system.
These changes are complex and could be difficult. They
will require top management to fully understand the issues
and needs and then focus single-mindedly on achieving the
necessary changes.
wheat (for domestic consumption). The Master Plan for Agriculture
specified six horticultural crops (almonds, grapes, raisons, apricots,
pomegranates and pistachios) that represent the bulk of an already
large horticulture output and which can readily achieve an eight
percent growth rate given the vibrant regional markets (e.g. India) in
which Afghan products have a very positive consumer identity. Wheat
has a large base of production and short term potential for a doubling
of yields. The livestock sector, in addition, has the potential to serve
a growing domestic market. Such a focus on the relative importance
of current production and potential growth provides the commodity
priorities for an initial allocation of research, extension, credit and
infrastructure investments. This kind of commodity focus has not
been coherently and consistently pursued.
5 A highly productive partnership between USAID, and the
Rockefeller and Ford Foundations during the 1950s and 60s gave
India a premier agricultural educational and research system.
USAID allocated large sums to develop agricultural universities.
These universities then provided the staff for the rapidly growing
public institutions with which Rockefeller collaborated—collaboration
which resulted in high-yielding corn, wheat and sorghum varieties.
Significantly, the Foundation never hired Indian researchers on
its staff. Instead, it worked with them in their national institutions,
offering incentives in the form of scholarships and field allowances.
The result was a national research and educational capacity that
continued after the foreign aid left. Ford Foundation did similar work
developing the extension system, using USAID-financed personnel
at the agricultural universities. Rockefeller research results went out
through those extension systems.
6 While he was still president of Taiwan, Teng-hui Lee, in a speech at
Cornell University, was unstinting in giving major credit to the United
States for the huge success in Taiwan’s agriculture as the foundation
of its takeoff into economic growth. None of this happens now.
Endnotes
1 John
Mellor is former Director-General of the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Chief Economist at USAID and
Professor, Cornell University. I am most grateful to Bread for the World
Institute staff and associates for their comments and suggestions.
2 The de-emphasis on country level strategic planning reached its
culmination in a recent directive for USAID field staff to refrain from
development-specific strategic thinking altogether.
3 The 2006 DAC Peer Review of U.S. development cooperation
policies and programs (http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3343,
en_2649_34603_37829787_1_1_1_1,00.html).
4 As an example, Afghanistan can readily achieve this growth rate based
on a combination of high value horticulture (largely for export) and
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