2002 to roughly 25 percent in 2007. While much of this increase is for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, there are
indications that DOD is also moving to fill what it sees as
a vacuum in terms of developmental activities in countries
deemed to be fragile or at risk, taking on activities that have
traditionally been the responsibility of USAID, such as building schools, clinics, water systems, and roads.6
Conversely, the State Department appears to be getting
USAID more involved in security issues. As an indication of
how entangled development and security have become, the
Department of State/USAID Joint Strategic Plan FY 2007-12
defines Strategic Goal 1 as “Achieving Peace and Security,”
and includes such strategic priorities as counterterrorism,
weapons of mass destruction, security cooperation, conflict
prevention, and transnational crime.7 All of these are important foreign policy objectives, but not what one would usually
consider development. “Investing in People” and “Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity,” the traditional goals
of development, are listed as Strategic Goals 3 and 4.
Since September 11, 2001, the combined development
and security aid budget has more than doubled, but the
capacity of the United States to plan and deliver effective
foreign aid has been diminishing. USAID, once the world’s
most respected foreign aid agency, has lost one-third of its
foreign service officers in the past 10 years. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that there are more musicians in
military bands than foreign service officers in the Department of State and USAID combined.8
U.S. Aid Effectiveness—The Case of Food Security
Foreign aid commitments are frequently expressed as
dollars or a percentage of a country’s GDP. But aid effectiveness is equally important. Over the past 50 years, there
has come to be widespread agreement on the characteristics
of effective aid: clear objectives, host-country “o wnership,”
accountability and flexibility, long-term commitments, integrated approaches, and adequate and reliable resources. Unfortunately, U.S. aid programs too often lack some of these
requirements. Efforts in the area of food security are a case
in point.
Clear Objectives—What are we trying to achieve? Food security
should be an overarching goal with responses ranging along
a continuum. Instead, feeding hungry people, especially in
times of humanitarian crisis, is viewed as a distinct goal that
is accorded higher priority than making it possible for people to feed themselves. Emergency food aid and agricultural
development programs have separate objectives, funding,
management, and congressional oversight. It follows that
they also have different political agendas and U.S. constituencies that support them. The net effect has been to starve
longer-term agricultural development in favor of short-term
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responses in the form of food aid. U.S. government funding
for agricultural development has been cut over the preceding
decades and reached its lowest level ever in FY 2007.
Host-Country Ownership—Ensuring that development efforts
are grounded in reality, and that aid-recipient countries and communities are committed to a shared vision: Recipient countries generally welcome both food aid and agricultural development
funds, but there is little indication that the allocation of overall food security resources is based on a collaborative determination of a country’s long-term food security interests. Indeed, countries’ interest in greater agricultural development
support has been given short shrift by donors responding
to other agendas. When given the opportunity to set their
own priorities, as is the case with Millennium Challenge Account compacts, countries almost invariably place increased
emphasis on agriculture and rural development.
Flexibility and Accountability—Applying the right resources in
the right way, and holding implementers responsible for results: Both
food aid and agricultural development resources are encumbered by numerous restrictions. Food aid, for example, must
be delivered in-kind rather than in cash, procured in the United States, and shipped on U.S.-flagged vessels. During emergencies, when a speedy response is critical, the inefficiencies
caused by these requirements become all too apparent. Inkind food aid can also make it difficult for local farmers to
sell their crops by distorting prices in local markets, which
in the long run slows local production and undermines the
goal of sustainable food security. Agricultural development
resources themselves are subject to earmarks and directives
that often impede their effective use. Because of “Buy America” requirements, development funding often ends up being
spent disproportionately on U.S. technical assistance.
Long-Term Commitment—Development takes time: A country’s
food security is determined, in large measure, by its institutional and infrastructural capacity—the ability of educational
institutions and research farms to train agricultural scientists, develop appropriate technologies and transfer them to
farmers; and the availability of irrigation and transportation
systems. All these capabilities must be complemented by
policies that encourage investment in agricultural productivity. And this process requires patience and significant levels
of investment, both of which have been in short supply in
recent years.
An Integrated Approach—Ensuring that programs don’t undercut
or contradict each other: The programs or actions of numerous
agencies and cabinet departments can affect development.
But if one doesn’t know—or doesn’t appreciate—what another
is doing, it is entirely possible for policies and programs to
work at cross-purposes. For example, U.S. agricultural and
trade policies that restrict market access and subsidize production make it difficult for farmers in poor countries to
Bread for the World Institute 5