C OVER STORY
ister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub
Khan signed an agreement to withdraw to pre-August
lines no later than February 25, 1966. The ceasefire
though, was criticized by many hardliners and laymen
alike in Pakistan who, relying solely on official reports
and Pakistani media, believed that the leadership had
surrendered military gains. Pakistan State's reports had
suggested that their military was performing admirably
in the war - which they blamed as being initiated by India
- and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.[45] Some recent books published
by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief titled
"The Myth of 1965 Victory",[46] allegedly exposed such
Pakistani fabrications about the war, but were bought
out by Pakistan Army to prevent its sale because it
was "too sensitive".[47][48]India reported a number of
ceasefire violations by Pakistan besides the expected
exchange of small arms and artillery fire. India charged
Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan
countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India.
[49] India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to
intrude and capture an Indian village of Chananwalla in
the Fazilka sector. This was recaptured by Indian troops
on 25 December. On October 10, a B-57 Canberra on
loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired
from the IAF base at Ambala. Pakistan claims that the
pilot, S/L Rashid Meer flew the aircraft back but given
that it suffered further damage when the nose wheel
did not extend[50] while landing, the aircraft is a possible write off. Another Pakistani Army Auster was shot
down on 16 December, killing one Pak Army Captain.
Yet again, on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down
by IAF Hunters.The ceasefire ensured a six year period
of relative peace between the two neighboring rivals before war broke out once again in 1971.
Indian miscalculations
Strategic miscalculations by both nations ensured that
the result of this war remained a stalemate. The Indian
Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered
significant losses as a result. The "Official History of the
1965 War", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India
in 1992 was a long suppressed document that outlined
intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the
war. According to the document, on September 22 when
the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the
Indian Prime Minister asked the commanding Gen.
Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to
hold off accepting the ceasefire for a while longer. The
general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition
had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered
considerable tank loss.It was found later that only 14%
of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India
still held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan did.
By this time, the Pakistani Army itself had used close to
80% of its ammunition. Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal,
who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict,
points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and
the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to
the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for
the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude
of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the
"Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes
attributed to the Indian army towards the other branches
of the Indian Military.[51]
Pakistani miscalculations
The Pakistani Army's failures started from the drawing
board itself, with the supposition that a generally discontent Kashm