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EUROPEAN UNION & AFRICAN UNION RELATIONS:
Beyond Institutional Twinning
In the joint annual consultative meeting between
the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council
(PSC) and the European Union Political and Security
Committee (EU PSC) on 16 October 2015 it was
crucial that contentious issues were not swept under
the rug: tricky questions such as the International
Criminal Court (ICC) or how to implement the African
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to move the
relationship forward. From a European perspective, a strong relationship with
the AU ensures that the principles of ownership and
joint action are respected, thereby ensuring that the EU
does not act unilaterally in Africa. There is increasing
sophistication in the attempts to ensure a shared
understanding of crises prior to greater coordination;
last February, the PSC and the EU PSC undertook a
joint field mission to Mali to support efforts towards
establishing peace and security in the country.
The 8th joint annual consultative meeting between the
PSC and the EU PSC was the most recent illustration of
the constant interaction between the two organisations
in the area of peace and security. There has been a
gradual strengthening of links between these similar
organs since their first meeting in 2008. However, the
16 October meeting should serve as a starting point to
improve the design of this critical gathering and foster
a more consistent dialogue in order to have a greater
impact on shared peace and security challenges. Shared challenges
Growing sophistication
On 30 September 2008, PSC members met their
counterparts from the EU PSC for the first time.
According to a 2008 report by the European Council,
this first meeting was an ‘opportunity of further
enhancing crisis management ties and dialogue
between the African Union and European Union,
with regard to such essential issues as strengthening
the African peace and security architecture and
African peacekeeping capacities’. Seven years later,
this meeting has become annual and is the main
institutional mechanism for the implementation of
the EU–Africa partnership on peace and security.
The relationship between the two organisations has
been reinforced despite differences in size (27 EU
members versus 15 AU members), mandates (the PSC is
a deciding body while the EU PSC advises the European
Council) and capacity (the EU-PSC relies on several
already established bodies while the PSC is supported
by fewer organs with lesser capacities).
EU foots the bill for AU peacekeeping
This has been mutually beneficial within the
framework of the Joint EU–AU Strategy. From an
African perspective, it offers the PSC the opportunity
to establish a more direct relationship with the main
EU decision-making body in the area of security,
namely the European Council. This is significant since
all AU peace support operations (such as in Darfur and
Somalia) are mostly funded through the African Peace
Facility. The EU Commission manages this financial
instrument, while allocation decisions fall within the
competency of the EU PSC.
Various issues were likely to be addressed by the
participants this year: shared challenges (migrants,
terrorism), situations where the EU and AU are largely
in agreement (the political crisis in Burkina Faso,
the conflicts in South Sudan and Somalia) and the
implementation of APSA. The challenge of this 2015
meeting lies in the ability of participants to reduce the
gap between their respective approaches to issues such
as the ICC and the crisis in Burundi. For instance, while
the EU has imposed sanctions against four Burundian
officials, the AU is less eager to do so.
How to improve the impact of AU/EU meetings?
The EU–Africa dialogue still suffers from several
limitations, such as the focus on form rather than
substance. For example, the PSC and EU PSC’s joint field
mission to Mali took place in a country where neither
is the primary actor. From this perspective, reaching
a common assessment does not have any policy
consequences where these organs would be the primary
decision makers. Moreover, two questions arise about
the joint annual consultative meeting in its current form.
The first one deals with its orientation. Looking at the
past seven events, it is clear that there is a tendency
towards reviewing current crises rather than addressing
broader themes. The PSC and EU PSC meetings are
increasingly focused on asserting common positions
on current crises while the strengthening of APSA is
addressed unevenly. According to a Swedish study,
‘The [first PSC–EU PSC] meeting was seen as a success,
however with a certain tendency of the African side
preferring to discuss current crises rather than [the]
AU’s internal capacity building.’
Strengthening African capacities in managing crises is the
main goal of the AU–EU strategy in peace and security
matters and the PSC–EU PSC meeting is meant to be the
main instrument to implement this goal. Consequently
there is a growing risk that this mechanism could lose its
original strategic outreach to favour short-term issues.
There is a danger that both the PSC and the EU PSC
react to current crises instead of designing long-term
coordinated and proactive responses.