The fourth part of our series on 400 years of UK – Japan relations explains how one of the modern world ’ s closest associations occurred .
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The fourth part of our series on 400 years of UK – Japan relations explains how one of the modern world ’ s closest associations occurred .
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As Britain and Japan mark 400 years of close diplomatic and trade ties — an occasion celebrated in both countries with a series of events throughout the year — it is worth remembering that the relationship originally came about primarily as a result of misunderstanding and misconception on the part of the British .
Professor Timon Screech is head of History of Art at the School of Oriental and African Studies , University of London and co-chair of the Japan400 organising committee . In this capacity , he delivered a lecture on 11 June at the British Embassy Tokyo , where he pointed out that the Clove had arrived off the coast of Hirado , Kyushu , four centuries earlier to the day .
The vessel belonged to the East India Company and had aboard an elegantly designed letter from King James I , as well as gifts for the “ emperor of Japan ”, by which they meant Tokugawa Ieyasu , who had officially retired but still guided the ruling hand of his son , Hidetada , the titular shogun of Edo .
The first British diplomatic mission to Japan was headed by John Saris of the East India Company . He was quickly contacted by William Adams , an English seaman who , already in the country some 12 years , had arrived aboard a Dutch ship and had become a trusted friend and adviser to Ieyasu .
The new arrivals received lavish gifts from their hosts , including gold screens
A replica of John Saris ’ diary was displayed at the British Embassy Tokyo .
that since have been lost to history , and two suits of armour , which are kept in the Tower of London .
However , it was a vermilion seal letter ( known as a shuinjo ) that Saris wanted . Once granted , the letter — which has also survived to this day — gave British nationals official permission to reside in Japan and set up trading stations .
It is at this point , Professor Screech said , that England ’ s errors become apparent .
“ We may ask just what the English thought they were doing in Japan ; why go ?” Screech said . “ Today , it seems obvious — Japan being such a rich and advanced nation — but the East India Company was a spice trading enterprise and Japan [ had ] no spices ”.
The decision to send a ship to Japan was made more than a decade after the firm ’ s founding in 1600 . Then facing stiff competition from the Dutch and Portuguese , the firm was seeking to discover and develop new markets . According to Screech , a costly expedition to Japan was considered worthwhile for three reasons . “ But all three were complete errors ”, he said .
The first misconception was Japan ’ s size . “ Japan had never been mapped by Europeans , who relied on Japanese depictions , with European cartographers simply inserting these into their own world maps ”, he explained . “ Every European map of the period makes Japan about 50 times too big , often several times the size of India .
“ This gave the entirely fallacious view that it would be a huge market ”.
The second miscalculation concerned the product that England would be exporting . The East India Company had sailed east to purchase spices , but they had to be paid for in either bullion or England ’ s only world-class indigenous product : wool .
“ You can ’ t sell wool in spice-growing places , where the average temperature is over 30 degrees ”, he said . “ But since maps proved Japan to be in the north , like Britain , it would surely want woollen [ products ].
“ And if the place was as big as depicted , it would surely consume an endless amount ”, he added . “ The error here was that , although Japan does have harsh winters , the Japanese had their own perfectly adequate garments already and it was not clear that English ones were superior .
“ Moreover , it was hard to transport wool so far without it rotting ”, he said .
Strike two for English assumptions . But there was still a plan C .
“ On maps of the period , the Russian Far East , Siberia and the Kurile Islands are simply missing ”, he said . “ This fostered the belief that , while going to Japan via Africa and India was long , a short route existed over the top of Russia ”.
An added advantage was that this would avoid areas held by the Portuguese and Spanish , as well as the Dutchcontrolled Bantam Strait , on the tip of Java .
Taken together , the concept of a perfect trading route would have seen English wool being shipped over Russia to Japan , where it would be sold for Japanese silver . The silver would then travel down to the “ spiceries ”, where silver was the preferred form of payment , and exchanged for nutmeg , mace , cloves and pepper . These would then return to London over northern Russia — and with not a Dutchman , Spaniard or Portuguese in sight to interfere .
It was not until well into the 1620s that the English realised their mistakes — and that spices could be purchased in Amsterdam anyway — and dropped the scheme .
Although based on error and shortlived , Professor Screech said that this mutual exposure of the British and Japanese to each other was not forgotten . It made a deep impression that , in time , would grow into one of the modern world ’ s closest and most enduring trade and political relationships .
Further information : http :// japan400 . com /
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