Banker S.A. January 2015 - Edition 12 . | Page 14

State housing banks aim to provide a financial service to market segments to which the market fails to deliver. or informal income groups or to households in rural areas, where commercial lenders do not have networks, involves higher origination and servicing costs, higher risks, lower incomes and fewer crossselling opportunities. As SHBs have lower profitability goals and because of their state backing, they are seen as a natural substitute. • Providing a useful policy implementation tool. SHBs can react to instructions from the state. For example, Thailand selected housing as one of the drivers for economic recovery after its 1997 economic crisis. It created an SHB to channel below-market mortgage loans to stimulate construction and absorb excess housing stock. Similarly, France used an SHB to provide subsidised housing loans and varied the quantum of subsidies available to either enliven or dampen demand cycles. WHERE SHBs GO WRONG A striking feature of the vast majority of SHBs is the frequency of bail outs and rescue 12 operations in countries such as France, Brazil, Indonesia, and numerous African countries. The quantum of bail outs, compared to on-budget welfare housing subsidies, has been much higher. For example, the cost of the Brazilian Caixa Economica Federal (SHB) bail out in 2001 was $8 billion, which equated to 25 years of welfare housing subsidies. SHBs are far more vulnerable than commercial lenders are, due to poor risk management/operational policy, administrative weaknesses and the predominance of a rule-based (as opposed to a risk-based) culture. Specialisation can also increase this susceptibility, as an SHB focuses solely on the housing market. This may lead to excessive exposure during property market downturns. Other reasons for the failure of SHBs include weak corporate governance and lax management of credit risk. On average, non-performing loans within SHBs range between 20% and 30% of an overall loan portfolio. In some instances, this is as high as 70%. On the other hand, private sector lenders go into “corrective shock mode” when this rati œ