administration paid different individuals to buy their loyalty,
even videotaping many actual acts of bribery. There was a
logic to this. Beyond just recordkeeping, this evidence
made sure that the accomplices were now on record and
would be considered as guilty as Fujimori and Montesinos.
After the fall of the regime, these records fell into the hands
of journalists and authorities. The amounts are revealing
about the value of the media to a dictatorship. A Supreme
Court judge was worth between $5,000 and $10,000 a
month, and politicians in the same or different parties were
paid similar amounts. But when it came to newspapers and
TV stations, the sums were in the millions. Fujimori and
Montesinos paid $9 million on one occasion and more than
$10 million on another to control TV stations. They paid
more than $1 million to a mainstream newspaper, and to
other newspapers they paid any amount between $3,000
and $8,000 per headline. Fujimori and Montesinos thought
that controlling the media was much more important than
controlling politicians and judges. One of Montesinos’s
henchmen, General Bello, summed this up in one of the
videos by stating, “If we do not control the television we do
not do anything.”
The current extractive institutions in China are also
crucially dependent on Chinese authorities’ control of the
media, which, as we have seen, has become frighteningly
sophisticated. As a Chinese commentator summarized,
“To uphold the leadership of the Party in political reform,
three principles must be followed: that the Party controls the
armed forces; the Party controls cadres; and the Party
controls the news.”
But of course a free media and new communication
technologies can help only at the margins, by providing
information and coordinating the demands and actions of
those vying for more inclusive institutions. Their help will
translate into meaningful change only when a broad
segment of society mobilizes and organizes in order to
effect political change, and does so not for sectarian
reasons or to take control of extractive institutions, but to
transform extractive institutions into more inclusive ones.
Whether such a process will get under way and open the
door to further empowerment, and ultimately to durable
political reform, will depend, as we have seen in many