feels . In contrast , the dual-process model suggests that I may be able to change her mind , and even her ‘‘ heart ,’’ by starting with her ‘‘ head ’’. The disagreement is not over the importance , or perhaps even the dominance , of emotion and intuition in moral decision-making . The disagreement is over the reality , or even the mere possibility , of what we regard as genuinely reasoned moral discussion . 7
Anyone who has had the experience of trying to change the mind of someone concerning a hot topic like vaccination , being a vegan , voting for a particular party , or the reality of gender , knows what Haidt is saying here . As much as we might protest , being the rational people we are , there are clearly matters on which the heart will overrule the head regardless of the validity of our rationalist arguments .
Nonetheless , there is comfort in Green ’ s position , which suggests that the best way to bring about a change is to base the argument on inviting your interlocutor to consider the consequences of their position . This can only be done with reason , and if it identifies an inconsistency between the intuitive view and the admitted negative consequences , it can at least set up a tension between the heart and mind that can lead to reassessment .
Conclusions
Intuition is a powerful motivator of action and a strong revelatory factor , telling us how we are feeling . In those of us who attend to its promptings it may prove to have been a trustworthy guide to behaviour . But if we accept that it lacks a moral component , then it may prove a poor guide to ethical and / or moral decision-making . It would demand the additional input , and perhaps corrective , of moral reasoning . It is suggested here that an examination of the decision that looks critically at the consequences - all consequences , of course , as best we can imagine and predict - can provide
... the dual-process model suggests that I may be able to change her mind , and even her ‘‘ heart ,’’
such moral reasoning to our clients , to our profession , to the communities we are living among , and to ourselves , both intrinsic and extrinsic . If nothing else , such an examination may have the additional consequence of deepening the personal and professional self-reflection we require of ourselves .
Please feel free to contact the author with any comments , feedback or criticisms of this article : Paul . Strube @ endeavour . edu . au
REFERENCES
1 . Strube P . Conscience-based ethics , Journal of the Australian Traditional Medicine Society . 2021 ; 7 ( 2 ), 92-94 .
2 . Haidt J . The emotional dog and its rational tail : A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment . Psychological Review . 2001 ; 108 ( 4 ), 814 – 834 . by starting with her ‘‘ head ’’.
3 . Pizarro DA , Bloom P . The intelligence of moral intuitions : Comment on Haidt . Psychological Review . 2003 ; 110 ( 1 ), 197 – 198 .
4 . Greene JD , Cushman FA , Stewart LE , Lowenberg K , Nystrom LE . Cohen JD . Pushing moral buttons : The interaction between personal force and intention in moral judgment . Cognition . 2009 ; 111 ( 3 ), 364 – 371 .
5 . Greene JD , Morelli SA , Lowenberg K , Nystrom LE , Cohen JD . Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment . Cognition . 2008 ; 107 ( 3 ), 1144 – 1154 .
6 . Petrinovich L , O ’ Neill P , Jorgensen M . An empirical study of moral intuitions : Toward an evolutionary ethics . Journal of Personality and Social Psychology . 1993 ; 64 ( 3 ), 467 – 478 .
7 . Bucciarelli M , Khemlani S , Johnson-Laird PN . The psychology of moral reasoning . Judgment and Decision Making . 2008 ; 3 ( 2 ), 121 – 139 .
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