ASEBL Journal – Volume 13 Issue 1, January 201 8
unknowable reality in which their oppositions case” (Pragmatism p. 50). In other
words, neither materialism nor theism could provide an adequate foundation for truth
as extrinsic to human endeavors, they were simply alternative descriptions of a claim
that pragmatism rejected ab initio.
James therefore argued that the difference between theism and materialism, pragmati-
cally considered, lies not in the superiority of one over the other in providing a teleo-
logical grounding for the universe, but in the difference either hypothesis makes in the
direction of future efforts. A theistic impulse has real, concrete truth value because it
gives credence to hope for the future, both individually and communally.
If theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be true,
for pragmatism, in the sense of being good for so much. For how much more
they are true, will depend entirely on their relations to the other truths that al-
so have to be acknowledged. (Pragmatism, p. 40-41, italics in original)
James’ discussion of the argument for design in nature, post Darwin, declares that it
has lost all value in terms of proving the existence or describing a designer – from a
pragmatic point of view, the universe is the same whether it was designed or evolved
by chance, the only value, again, lies in the idea of a designer as a promise of hope, of
better things in the future.
Based on this approach, James critiqued Spencer’s materialist conception of mind as
being severely limited – comprised solely of rational cognition – and leaving out sen-
timents, aesthetic judgments, and emotions (Remarks on Spencer in Essays in Philos-
ophy p. 8-9). This critique still rings true today in regard to much of the language of
pro-genetic enhancement. James’ own criterion for choice of theories was based on
giving the largest sum of satisfactions, taste included (Pragmatism p. 104). James ar-
gued elsewhere that “the disinterested love of information, and still more the love of
consistency in thought (that true scientific oestrus)and the ideal fealty to Truth (with a
capital T), are all so many particular forms of aesthetic interest” (James, Essays in
Philosophy, p. 20-21). The teleology of scientific inquiry and technological develop-
ment is, for James, as for Kant, based on aesthetic judgments, directing the mind to
what it finds harmonious, ordered, and well-suited for a particular purpose.
This is not the limit to James’ remarks on teleology, however. A bit later in Pragma-
tism, he raises the topic of unity of purpose, a phrase that is not explicitly identified as
teleological, but bears a noted resemblance to Kant’s concept of intrinsic purposive-
ness in nature. After pointing out the multiplicity of human systems and activities,
each with their own purposes, either connecting or conflicting with one another, but
over time tends towards greater complexity and difference from earlier purposes – a
strikingly evolutionary turn of phrase – he arrives at the conclusion that “everything
makes strongly for the view that our world is incompletely unified teleologically and
is still trying to get its unification better organized” (James, Pragmatism, Lecture IV,
p. 77).
Human teleology is therefore evolving and pluralistic, rather than original, fixed and
singular, and requires the participation of humans as actual agents as well as constitu-
ent members of the natural world. This conception provides an alternative solution to
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