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Notes
1. Thick concepts are one that carry both descriptive and normative components. They are both world-
guided and action-guiding. See, for instance, Williams (2011) chapters 7-8.
2. See Putnam (2002), chapter 2
3. Murdoch discusses the relevance of perception to moral philosophy in a number of essays, many of
which can be found in Murdoch (1999). Among the admirers I have in mind are Antonaccio (2000). Clif-
ton (2013), Starkey (2006) and Blum (1991),
4. I’ve abstracted these from the cases in Blum (1991).
5. Blum (1991) p. 702
6. Harman (1979) p. 4
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Does Everything Flow? A Reply to Sparks
Jonathan R. Goodman
I thank the editors for inviting me to comment on Dr. Sparks’s essay, “Moral Percep-
tion and Morally Relevant Perception.” The essay’s ce ntral point, which the author
defends effectively, is that proponents of the view that moral perception is possible
are mistaking the perception of morality for the perception of morally relevant fea-
tures of a particular event.
In this comment I would like, however, to question whether the distinction between
moral perceptions and perceptions of morally relevant features is a necessary one, and
to suggest, with a caveat, that the morally relevant features of some event are just the
constituents of a moral perception.
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