ASEBL Journal – Volume 13 Issue 1 , January 2018
Werner , in making the case that Norma ’ s experiential state involves the representation of badness , writes : Norma ’ s experiential state meets three conditions that we would standardly count as sufficient for a state ’ s representing some property F . First ... Norma has developed a disposition to be in this particular experiential state which more or less reliably tracks badness . Second , and relatedly , Norma ’ s relevantly associated phenomenology is counterfactually correlated with badness ( or at least a particular type of badness ) in her local environment . Finally , Norma is disposed to form moral beliefs based on experiential states of this kind ... It would appear then that we have some good preliminary reasons in favor [ of the perception of moral properties ] as the best explanation of the contrast in question . ( Werner 2014 p . 10 )
But those three conditions are not sufficient for Norma ’ s experiential state to count as representing a moral property . I might get a certain feeling in my leg whenever the pressure drops and rain is likely . I might have a disposition to be in this particular experiential state that tracks rain-tomorrow , such a state might be counterfactually correlated with rain-tomorrow , and I might be disposed to form beliefs about raintomorrow on the basis of similar experiential states . But that doesn ’ t show that I ’ m perceiving the property rain-tomorrow . That would be to confuse the perception of properties that are relevant for my judgement about rain-tomorrow with my perception of rain-tomorrow itself . Similarly , Werner is here confusing the perception of morally relevant properties with the perception of moral properties themselves .
Later , in considering whether or not a difference in the perception of non-moral properties ( in this case being-a-cat-in-pain ) can best explain the difference between Norma and Pathos , Werner writes : The problem with this explanation is that there is no reason to suppose that Pathos fails to perceive the property of being-a-cat-in-pain if we already suppose that Norma does . And this is what would be required to generate a phenomenal contrast . As noted above , eedis are not impaired in their ability to perceive the pain or suffering of others . Nor are they impaired in their ability to perceive any other non-moral properties . Since eedis are not impaired in their ability to perceive most non-moral properties , the explanation given with respect to being-a-cat-in-pain will extend to other alternative explanations of this third sort . ( Werner 2014 p . 17 )
The issue here is that Werner fails to recognize the more subtle features of morally relevant perception that we listed at the beginning of this section . There is reason to suppose that being-a-cat-in-pain fails to enter into Pathos ’ thinking in the way we would hope , either because he fails to attend to that feature of the scenario , or because he fails to recognize the moral relevance of that property , or because his thinking is distorted in some other way . That ’ s all consistent with Pathos being able to see that the cat is in pain . If we fully appreciate how perception can be morally relevant , we needn ’ t assume that it ’ s a difference in moral perception proper that explains the phenomenal contrast between Normal and Pathos .
As a third and final example of this pattern of argument , consider this passage from
25