ASEBL Journal – Volume 13 Issue 1 , January 2018
Both definitions , I argue , while useful for scientific inquiry , inadequately capture the necessary criteria for one ’ s behavior to qualify as altruistic : practical understanding of culture , or in the case of animal populations in which reciprocal altruism is observed , the correct following of socially learned rules . If an agent understands a culture well , she is able to interact with others in a way that raises the likelihood that her intentions will be perceived as altruistic . She is able to skillfully send a signal about her willingness to help others , from which observers make a judgment about her character .
Viewing altruism as a signal also links the philosophical definition with the biological : the signal itself is an effect which is determined in part by an agent ’ s intentions . Yet while those with good practical understanding are able to successfully communicate their intentions to behave altruistically , selfish people with practical understanding are able to manipulate others using this signaling system . What we call altruism , I argue , is exploitable for Darwinian purposes .
II . Altruism as intention
In philosophy , altruism is often defined by an agent ’ s intention . Nagel ( 1969 / 1979 ), for example , argues that an agent is altruistic insofar as she intends to act in the interests of others . If someone makes a gift to another person intending to be generous and without ulterior motives , she is behaving altruistically , implying that intention can be a sufficient condition for altruistic behavior .
Yet if I try to make a gift to someone without considering my interests , and instead consider hers only , it does not necessarily follow that I behave altruistically . This can be demonstrated by comparing “ behaved altruistically ” with “ was honest .” If I intend to be honest and inadvertently tell someone something untrue , saying “ I was being honest when I told you that untruth ” implies only that I intended to be honest , or rather that I was sincere .
If , similarly , I intended to give someone a gift and mistakenly gave that person an empty box , it would be inappropriate to say “ I was behaving altruistically when I gave you that empty box .” Even if my interests or intentions are not called into question by the recipient of my intended gift , I would be guilty only of having altruistic intentions , though I would not have behaved altruistically .
Using the agent-focused definition of altruism , the analogy Altruism : Altruistic behavior as Honesty : Veracity
elucidates this point . Honest or altruistic intention may be a necessary criterion for veracity or altruistic behavior , respectively , but neither is sufficient for either outcome . We distinguish “ honesty ” from “ sincerity ” in the same way that we distinguish an agent ’ s intention to be altruistic from her behaving altruistically . This does not suggest a flaw in Nagel ’ s definition of altruism , but rather that the intention-based definition does not provide a sufficient criterion for altruistic behavior .
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