ASEBL Journal – Volume 13 Issue 1, January 2018
Both definitions, I argue, while useful for scientific inquiry, inadequately capture the necessary criteria for one’ s behavior to qualify as altruistic: practical understanding of culture, or in the case of animal populations in which reciprocal altruism is observed, the correct following of socially learned rules. If an agent understands a culture well, she is able to interact with others in a way that raises the likelihood that her intentions will be perceived as altruistic. She is able to skillfully send a signal about her willingness to help others, from which observers make a judgment about her character.
Viewing altruism as a signal also links the philosophical definition with the biological: the signal itself is an effect which is determined in part by an agent’ s intentions. Yet while those with good practical understanding are able to successfully communicate their intentions to behave altruistically, selfish people with practical understanding are able to manipulate others using this signaling system. What we call altruism, I argue, is exploitable for Darwinian purposes.
II. Altruism as intention
In philosophy, altruism is often defined by an agent’ s intention. Nagel( 1969 / 1979), for example, argues that an agent is altruistic insofar as she intends to act in the interests of others. If someone makes a gift to another person intending to be generous and without ulterior motives, she is behaving altruistically, implying that intention can be a sufficient condition for altruistic behavior.
Yet if I try to make a gift to someone without considering my interests, and instead consider hers only, it does not necessarily follow that I behave altruistically. This can be demonstrated by comparing“ behaved altruistically” with“ was honest.” If I intend to be honest and inadvertently tell someone something untrue, saying“ I was being honest when I told you that untruth” implies only that I intended to be honest, or rather that I was sincere.
If, similarly, I intended to give someone a gift and mistakenly gave that person an empty box, it would be inappropriate to say“ I was behaving altruistically when I gave you that empty box.” Even if my interests or intentions are not called into question by the recipient of my intended gift, I would be guilty only of having altruistic intentions, though I would not have behaved altruistically.
Using the agent-focused definition of altruism, the analogy Altruism: Altruistic behavior as Honesty: Veracity
elucidates this point. Honest or altruistic intention may be a necessary criterion for veracity or altruistic behavior, respectively, but neither is sufficient for either outcome. We distinguish“ honesty” from“ sincerity” in the same way that we distinguish an agent’ s intention to be altruistic from her behaving altruistically. This does not suggest a flaw in Nagel’ s definition of altruism, but rather that the intention-based definition does not provide a sufficient criterion for altruistic behavior.
11