ASEBL Journal – Volume 10 Issue 1, January 2014
Churchland’s contribution to the report, “Human Dignity from a Neurophilosophical
Perspective,” may have been the germ of Braintrust. Besides calling attention to the
neural origins of moral sentiment, Churchland describes the tragic history of
“misplaced moral certitude.” She points out that past advances in medical technology,
including vaccination for smallpox, anesthesia for use in surgery and childbirth,
dissection of corpses, organ donation, and blood transfusion were all initially
prohibited by religious and political authorities with similar moral certitude (and
“wisdom of repugnance”) at the cost of tens of thousands of preventable deaths. The
loss of life in these historical examples bears its own emotional valence to those who
see human suffering as a greater harm than rule-breaking. More importantly, they
serve to undermine the is/ought dichotomy by juxtaposing moral norms with the
measurable, real-world consequences disregarded by tautological, ought-ought
moralizing.
In the council’s published report, Churchland’s essay is followed by a reply from
council member and theologian Gilbert Meilaender. Rather than engaging the tenets
of Churchland’s argument, Meileander simply launches an ad hominem attack on
Churchland, herself, for “breath[ing] a spirit of condescension.” Rather than
qualifying or refuting Churchland’s evidence, Meileander denies her right to cite it.
Like Kass, Meileander appeals to sentiment as a power greater than reason and claims
that if Churchland does not feel the same disgust a Catholic feels at HPV vaccinations
or stem-cell research, she is therefore unfit to question them. “Unless and until one is
capable of that,” Meileander demands, “the most dignified thing to do would be to
remain silent.” In other words, only those who share the same foregone conclusion are
allowed to question its logic or implications. Conspicuously, Meileander invokes the
term “dignity” in an attempt to silence Churchland, proving her (and Macklin’s)
original point – “dignity,” like “wise disgust,” is not a reason but a rejection of reason
and testable evidence in moral arguments. What Meileander forgets to mention is that
this emotionalistic certainty which is immune to rational criticism drafts public policy
and impacts the lives of thousands, if not millions of people with Parkinson’s disease,
cervical cancer, and other potentially preventable diseases. Neither Meileander nor
Kass inquire into the gut feelings of those crippled by these diseases, nor do they
invoke “human dignity” in their defense.
By openly exhibiting and even prioritizing the same sorts of behavior observable in
monkeys and rats, professional moralists like Kass and Meileander prove
Churchland’s argument in the very tactics they use to attack it. Moral arguments begin
with evolved, brain-based heuristics which precede and structure conscious reasoning.
This does not make them bad or good, but it makes them deceptively convincing when
they are at their most self-indulgent. The most highly educated modern human is alltoo-capable of ignoring evidence and abandoning reason whenever he feels like it.
More importantly, moralists don’t seem to regard these feelings, themselves, as
needing explanation. This is as problematic in the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas
(whose empathy-based morality famously failed to find real-world application in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict) as it is in the theology of Gilbert Meileander or the
punditry of Leon Kass. Since demands for “ethics in science” can be a smoke-screen
for imposing irrational restrictions on scientific research and its ability to save and
improve lives, we might at least counterbalance the ethics of science with a science of
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