BETWEEN THE LOCAL , THE GLOBAL , AND THE AID ECONOMY IN PALESTINE
wards representations of a borderless “ Palestine ” inclusive of all Palestinian populations , as to creating international representations recognized as on par with modern ( and sovereign ) nation states . A mapping of national identity that reaches past conditions of occupation and dispersion , it also aims past the territorialized conception of sovereignty attached to the failed Oslo Accords and to foreign interventions in Palestine .
“ Development towards peace ” at a time of conflict
Culture became a central focus for aid interventions in Palestine most especially after the second intifada ( 2000 – 2005 ). As El-Ghadban and Strohm ( 2013:188 ) write , “ culture became the new buzzword , the new commodity for foreign investment .” Foreign aid supported the establishment of cultural centers and the sponsorship of arts education programs and artists in different mediums . It also enabled the dissemination of Palestinian art locally , and importantly , abroad — in music festivals , art galleries , and film festivals . For Palestinian music conservatories , this support facilitated their tremendous growth and snowballing presence in public life over the past couple of decades ( Beckles Willson , 2013 ). Yet the political economy created by foreign aid in Palestine is rife with contradictory aims and policies , and participation in it means navigating a terrain that often does not align with the cultural and political representations Palestinians aim for .
Critics argue that the aid economy has been constructed primarily to serve Israeli and Western interests in the region ( Leone , 2011 ; Taghdisi Rad , 2011 ). Their critiques are based on several claims . The first maintains that the aid economy in Palestine renders the occupation sustainable for Israel , rather than supporting an emergent Palestinian polity . As Sahar Taghdisi Rad points out ( 2011:18 , quoting Moore , 2008 ), donors have helped prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in the Occupied Territories , but they have also enabled Israel ’ s “ deluxe occupation in the West Bank — total military domination with no responsibility for running the life of the occupied population , and no price tag attached .”
The second critique addresses donors ’ interests and their effects on Palestinian society . It pegs the peacebuilding and humanitarian mandates of foreign interventions in Palestine on international financing institutions ’ ( IFIs ) commitments to Western governments and their stakes in a neoliberal global economy , international security , and spheres of political influence ( Taghdisi Rad , 2011 ; Tawil-Souri , 2012 ). The only frames proposed for the “ correct ” kind of Palestinian state to emerge in this context are liberalization and privatization . This promotes the privileging of top-down policymaking , international interests in the region , the PA ’ s top power echelons , and unchecked capitalism . It also leads to growing class divisions , deflection of real needs and democratic ideals , and promotion of an untenable acceptance of the status quo amongst civil society .
Ava Leone ( 2011 ) highlights the Orientalist subtext of these moves , contending that the shift from political rights to human rights discourses occurring in articulation with the second intifada , was accompanied by Western donors ’ narratives of Palestinians as
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