Arts & International Affairs: Volume 2, Issue 1 | Page 36

Margalit does not only differentiate the witness from the moral witness
and the moral witness from the paradigmatic moral witness, but he also
differentiates the moral witness from the political witness. While the one’s
testimony has an intrinsic value, the other “believes that the incriminating
evidence that she gathers is an instrument in the war effort” (p. ���). This
differentiation is puzzling for two reasons. First, an “unmitigated evil regime”
can display evil without being engaged in a war effort. Secondly, gathering
incriminating evidence as an instrument in a war effort would seem to be
in accordance with Margalit’s understanding, quoted above, that a moral
witness is he or she who documents and records what happens for some
future use; gathering evidence as an instrument in a war effort is surely in
accordance with the moral purpose of a testimonial mission, which is the
precondition for being a moral witness. Another reason for differentiating
the moral witness from the political witness lies in the difference between
“telling it like it was” and “telling it like it felt.” Margalit (p. ���) writes:
The political witness, by temperament and training, can be a much
better witness than the mere moral witness for the structure of
evil and not only for episodes of evil. And thus he can be a more
valuable witness in uncovering the factual truth. The political
witness can be very noble in fighting evil against all odds. And
yet as an ideal type, although his features partly overlap with
those of the moral witness, the political witness is still distinct,
not to be confused with the moral witness. Both are engaged in
uncovering what evil tries to cover up. The political witness may
be more effective in uncovering the factual truth, in telling it like
it was. But the moral witness is more valuable at telling it like it
felt, that is, telling what it was like to be subjected to such evil. The
first-person accounts of moral witnesses are essential to what they
report, whereas political witnesses can testify from a third-person
perspective without much loss.
If we apply this conceptualization to artists, then the following, not altogether
coherent, picture emerges. An artist is a moral witness, even a paradigmatic
moral witness, if he or she possesses “knowledge-by-acquaintance of
suffering,” that is, in order to qualify as a moral witness, an artist has to have
the actual and personal experience of suffering caused by an evil regime.
In the absence of such experience, an artist can be a moral witness if he or
she is at personal risk, either because he or she belongs to the same group
of people which is targeted or because he or she tries to document what
happens, or both. This documentation envisions future use, but not any
use; rather, future use has to be coupled with a moral purpose, ultimately
addressing a moral community, present or future. The emphasis on future
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