The Network Fusion Cell: Developing the Capability
can assume jurisdiction where the state is
unwilling or unable to conduct a prosecution.
Notably within NATO the US refused to ratify
the Rome Statute and acknowledge the ICC
due to the fear of politically motivated claims
against US troops .
Application to NATO
Many NATO countries have provisions within
their national legislation covering Command
Responsibility which would put them outside
the reach of the ICC. Examples of the doctrine
can be seen in the Canadian prosecutions
following the Somalia affair 14 and the United
Kingdom prosecutions following the death in
custody of Baha Mousa 15 . It is to be noted
that none of these incidents occurred during
a NATO operation.
A NATO commander does not have the au-
thority to discipline those he commands from
another nation. The authority to discipline a
THE NETWORK
FUSION CELL:
DEVELOPING THE
CAPABILITY
Major Charles Smith, British
Army
HQ ARRC has been the first NATO High Read-
iness Force (Land) (HRF(L) HQ to stand up a
Network Fusion Cell (NFC) and this short arti-
cle is designed to inform other HRF(L)s of AR-
subordinate is conducted under national ar-
rangements. At its highest a NATO command-
er can order an investigation into an incident
but he has no powers to order disciplinary
actions. NATO is not a signatory to the ICC
or Geneva Conventions and AP1 (although
all member states are bar the US) and so a
NATO Commander does not have “Command
Responsibility” in the legal sense for soldiers
in his command; that lies with the soldiers’ na-
tional chain of command.
Conclusion
As NATO commanders lack the authority to
discipline soldiers from another country it is
incumbent on national commanders within a
NATO operation to be aware of their personal
responsibility on behalf of their nation. This is
particularly pertinent where there are small na-
tional groups (Company or Platoon) operating
as part of a larger NATO force. These relatively
RC’s experience to date. The NFC’s role is to
inform the HQ decision making process and
fully support the Joint Targeting process. It
does this through Human Network Analysis
and Support to Targeting (HNAT) which is an
intelligence component of NATO’s approach to
Attacking the Networks. The description that
follows is based on the ARRC’s experience of
NFC employment in support of the JTFHQ, as
validated on Ex TRIDENT JAGUAR 15 and sub-
sequently on Ex ARRCADE FUSION 15.
In 2013 the Target Support Cell was renamed
the Network Fusion Cell. The NFC combines
junior commanders should be made aware of
the responsibility they hold for the actions of
their men. Discipline and LOAC training remain
a national responsibility and as such, a NATO
commander is not legally responsible for the
actions of his command from different na-
tionalities. The strategic communication and
wider ramifications of a failure, apparent or ac-
tual, to deal with breaches of LOAC are likely
to be serious and far-reaching and will affect
the achievement of the mission and its wider
perception in the international community. As
such command responsibility is not a matter
that a NATO commander can ignore as mere
“national business”.
About the author:
Major John Harris is a British Army
lawyer with more than a decade of
service, and one of a team of legal
advisors to the command at HQ ARRC.
with the All Sources Cell (ASC) to form the Fu-
sion Section of G2. At Peacetime Establish-
ment (PE), the NFC is relatively small, compris-
ing one OF-3 and seven other ranks. The bulk
are intelligence analysts with the addition of
two members of the Royal Artillery who have
primary responsibility for Battle Damage As-
sessment (BDA). BDA will not be discussed
further in this article. Under Crisis Establish-
ment (CE) the NFC can be augmented by a
range of specialists including cultural, political
and social media analysts and historians.
Figure 1: HQ ARRC Network Fusion Cell Organogram. Those boxes shaded solid green are the Peace Establishment posts. Those shaded partially or wholly purple
are Crisis Establishment posts
7