26 Improving Air Land Integration( ALI) within the Enhanced NATO Response Force( ENRF)
“ The deployment of a VJTF style force is something that has not been attempted for many years. The Enabling Command TTX was invaluable in bringing together key participants to tackle the deployment and sustainment issues.”
Lt Col Rick Jones, HQ 3( UK) Division on their Exercise RAMSTEIN DUST II. Sensing an opportunity to assist them with their FOC workup and explore synergies between collocated Land and Air HQs, an offer was made from the ARRC for the DARS to co-locate with us whilst we completed Ex ARRCADE FUSION 15 at Lielvarde Airbase, near Riga, in Latvia. This offer was gratefully accepted and both HQs worked together to meet up in Nov 15.
The DARS Core staff consists mainly of Air Battle Managers and CIS staff and although it has the equipment to be self-sustaining, it requires augmentation to be self-sufficient for Real Life Support( RLS) and Force Protection( FP). By co-locating with the ARRC, the DARS was able to deploy without augmentation, making use of the RLS the ARRC was providing to the much larger Land HQ; it was also able to be established within the ARRC FP footprint. Synergies already realised!
But it was in the operational environment that most synergies were found. Primarily providing the RAP to the Joint Force Air Component( the NATO Command Structure Core JFAC at HQ AIRCOM at Ramstein, or a NATO Force Structure JFAC such as the UK or Italian JFACs), the DARs was able to provide a real time RAP to the ARRC OPSCEN, providing fantastic situational awareness to the AOCC staff and the ARRC staff responsible for Battlespace management, Army Organic Air Deculminating in a Table-Top Exercise( TTX) in Lithuania to test the deployment and RSOM phases, with participants from all NATO Force Integration Units( NFIUs), Multi-National Corps- North East( MNC-NE), and the VJTF Framework Nation. Across all these events, a number of logistic challenges were identified. This article concentrates on the key issues with deploying the VJTF elements of the ENRF.
Logistic Challenges
• Strategic deployment assets. NATO countries have limited strategic deployment assets to move their force elements. Keeping these assets on call to meet the required timelines may impact on national defence business. The panacea of contractor support is also affected by readiness – to have assured access to commercial solutions at short notice is expensive. This is compounded by the range of potential destinations, from Estonia in the north to Turkey in the south, which increases the planning burden. The Graduated Response Plans( GRP) brings clarity to these extensive planning requirements, and negotiations between countries to share strategic assets to meet deployment timelines will alleviate the issue of limited availability.
• Freedom of Movement. It is expected that the VJTF will be deployed early in a crisis to act as a deterrent to further escalation. Therefore the deployment will likely be conducted under peace time conditions, with all attendant protocols such as diplomatic clearances, use of national transportation infrastructure and border crossings. Changing diplomatic clearance timelines requires nations to act at parliamentary level. This requires considerable political engagement of a large number of member states by NATO in order to reach agreements to allow the VJTF swifter passage of their territories.
• RSOM Command. While NATO has created a new headquarters to manage logistic support and coordination across the ENRF, this new Standing Joint Logistic Support Group( SJLSG) will not deploy early enough to command the RSOM of the VJTF brigade. A number of options for RSOM command were initially proposed: Host Nation( s); MNC-NE / MND-SE; NFIUs; or the Framework Nation. Whichever HQ is in the frame for RSOM command must be at the appropriate readiness to deploy and conduct the task prior to the JLSG taking over upon arrival in theatre. They require the capability to manage the reception of multinational units arriving into multiple points of disembarkation, potentially in multiple countries via road, sea, air and rail. For Ex AF 15, HQ MNC-NE conducted this role. While one option has been tested, this issue will receive further exploration and testing.
Conclusion
The ENRF marks a step change in NATO’ s capability to react quickly, decisively, and with credible force. It is not a new concept – the timelines and movement requirements would be recognisable to Cold War warriors. However in the intervening years NATO’ s focus has been on ISAF and other operations, so the relevant capabilities and corporate knowledge have waned. NATO is having to regenerate and relearn these skills at pace. There are still challenges to overcome in deploying a complex force in a short period of time. However, NATO now has a much better understanding of the scale and scope of these challenges thanks to exercises such as Ex AF 15, and HQ ARRC can move forward with creating executable solutions for ENRF 17.
About the author:
Major Tom Fortune, British Army, is a British Logistics Officer with over a decade of military experience, including two tours of Afghanistan. He is currently the OF-3 in charge of logistics in the Enabling Command and was the lead J4 officer for the EC-run NATO Force Structure JLSG on Ex ARRCADE FUSION 15.
IMPROVING AIR LAND INTEGRATION( ALI) WITHIN THE ENHANCED NATO RESPONSE FORCE( ENRF)
Group Captain Rob Norris, RAF
A great deal of focus since the Wales Summit has been on the ENRF and, specifically, the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force( VJTF). Whilst the majority of effort in HQ ARRC has, quite naturally, focussed on the VJTF( Land), the focus of the ARRC Air Operations Coordination Cell has been to understand what makes up the VJTF( Air) and how we can work together to maximise Joint Output.
The Power of the DARs
One of the key elements of the VJTF( A) is the Deployable Air Control Centre, Recognized Air Picture Production Centre and Sensor Fusion Post( DARS), based at Poggio Renatico, near Bologna, in Italy. Effectively a groundbased Airborne Warning and Control System( AWACS), the DARS is able to contribute fully to the production of the Recognized Air Picture( RAP) that is key to achieving the most important Airpower role, Control of the Air. The generation of the RAP provides commanders with visibility of friendly, unknown and hostile aircraft, and it is the first task that the Joint Force Air Component Commander will seek to accomplish in helping gain understanding the area the VJTF will deploy to.
The Benefits of Collocating
One of the key tenets of effective ALI is to seek opportunities for collocation of Air and Land Headquarters to improve mutual understanding. The most famous example is the collocation of Montgomery’ s 8th Army in North Africa with Coningham’ s Western Desert Air Force HQ. A slightly more contemporary example, closer to home to the ARRC was the collocation at Rheindalen of 1( BR) Corps( the ARRC’ s predecessor) and NATO’ s 2 Allied Tactical Air Force during the Cold War. Modern communications have reduced the need for collocation, but opportunities for tactical units from each component to work together and improve mutual understanding and awareness must be taken.
DARS and the ARRC – a potent combination?
Working towards their Full Operating Capability, DARS was seeking a location to deploy