24 Lessons from the Practical Application of Graduated Response Planning at the Land Tactical Level
HQ ARRC officers conduct combined, Joint and Collaborative Planning
Notice to Move( NTM) is often misinterpreted as Notice to Effect( NTE), and detailed planning led by HQ ARRC’ s Support Division and Enabling Command staff highlighted the realities of the timelines for deployment, reception, staging, onwards movement and integration( RSOMI). The reality of NTE must be understood and incorporated into political expectations and strategic communications messaging. Similarly detailed logistical planning challenged assumptions that Host Nations would be able to facilitate and sustain deployed NATO forces. This analysis was discussed with Ministerial level staff in the Baltics during Ex AF15 and was instrumental in enabling NATO, as well as Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian Ministries to understand better the support implications of facilitating the deployment and training requirements of a Divisional sized force or greater. It should be noted that the NFIUs will have an instrumental role in this. As outlined above, sustainment will also depend on legal and technical agreements being in place; this is a lost operational art since the end of the Cold War. Finally, a better understanding of NTE places increased importance on developing indicators and warnings of opposing forces’ actions and intent; this is a very complex challenge in a hybrid environment and must be resourced intellectually and physically.
may not be incremental and so Part 3 or Part 2 may be the most appropriate initial response to an emerging situation. The planning team also found it challenging to develop a plan that is sufficiently detailed to be activated rapidly, but at the same time is sufficiently generic enough to be applicable and adaptable to emerging and changing situations. Finally, the planning process developed an improved understanding of the likely roles of the VJTF( L) and IFFG( L) in deterrence, defence and offensive operations. Closely related was the importance of the analysis of the tipping point between the potential deterrent and provocative effect of these forces deploying into a complex, hybrid and sub-Article V situation. The forces delivering these effects concurrently also need to be able to react to a no-notice armed incursion, as well as operating with National Home Defence Forces( NHDF), whilst also setting the conditions for follow on forces.
The Value of Collaborative Planning
HQ ARRC planners were fortunate to be supported by a significant number of high quantity planners from Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia, staff from NATO Force Integration Units( NFIUs), HQ Multi-National Corps( North East), HQ 4( US) Infantry Division and advisers from the UK’ s Stabilisation Unit. Combined with the joint nature of HQ ARRC( with integral Maritime, Air and Special Operations planners), this comprehensive planning approach resulted in a truly collaborative and integrated outcome.
Planning for Operations within NATO Allies’ Borders
Several lessons were identified from planning an operation within NATO Allies’ borders. These include:
• National defence plans need to be coherent and mutually supporting. Any potential weaknesses or incoherence of plans represent an opportunity for opposing forces to exploit. Ex AF15 planning provided an excellent opportunity to share plans between Allies and proved pivotal in subsequently enabling future plans to be refined.
• The importance of understanding Host Nation sovereignty where NATO forces are operating cannot be understated. Planning for operations within Allied countries has unique challenges that differ greatly from recent operational experiences. For example, in the early stages of an emerging crisis, the Ministry of Interior will lead National security operations and often the Ministry of Defence( or equivalent) would be in a supporting role. NATO’ s role will therefore be supporting and will have a significant impact on: o Command and control structures o Rules of engagement o Land battlespace ownership.
• Different countries have different Emergency Crisis Systems and different statuses may exist in different countries at the same time. The position on this spectrum will impact on NATO freedoms and constraints impacting on how and when forces from the National Home Defence Forces( NHDF) are placed under NATO command.
• Criteria for the Transition of Authority( TOA) of force elements to NATO are extremely complex to define and agree, but are closely related to NATO presence and the position in crisis escalation.
• When operating within, and moving between, Allies’ borders, a number of legal and technical agreements are required. These agreements must be in place before deployment and include such areas as intelligence sharing, movement authorities for hazardous materials, and support agreements.
Notice to Effect and Sustainability.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Ex AF15 was a unique and superb opportunity not only to plan and deliver a real time deployment to the Baltics, but also to experiment in turning the concepts of the Graduated Response Plans into reality. Doing so requires a clear understanding of the context in which the plan is to be executed and an understanding of NATO’ s forces held at increased readiness following the Wales Summit in 2014. Developing a rapidly executable plan requires considerable collaborative planning and sufficient detail to execute the plan rapidly. By doing this in a near-real world scenario, HQ ARRC helped to establish a more realistic foundation upon which real world future plans for the region have been developed. Indeed, a Staff Officer at NATO’ s Headquarters Land Command commented:“ the work undertaken by HQ ARRC on Ex AF15 has proved to be invaluable in informing the real world planning that has been undertaken subsequently. It was innovative and undoubtedly paved the way for turning the GRP concept into a reality..” These plans are certainly more robust and deliverable as a direct result of the collaborative planning conducted at HQ ARRC in 2015.
About the author:
Colonel Richard Clements, British Army, has served on 5 operational tours in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. He served as SO2 Fire Coordination Plans in HQ ARRC in 2004-6, including a short time in HQ ISAF with the HQ. He is currently ACOS G5 Plans.